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Queers Anonymous: Lesbians, Gay Men,
Free Speech, and Cyberspace
Edward Stein*

Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority. It thus
exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights and of the
First Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular individuals
from retaliation-and their ideas from suppression-at the hand
of an intolerant society. 1

Pseudonymity allows people who are experimenting with different
sorts of interests to do so without social repercussions. People can
temporarily obscure their real life and play with a different conception of what their life might be. 2

I.

INTRODUCTION

The expansion of cyberspace in the past decade has created unprecedented opportunities for communication, both across the globe and
across the street. The Internet and other forms of cyberspace have provided new avenues for anonymous and pseudonymous communication.
Individuals can now interact without the traditional constraints of time,
place, and manner of communication.
As the number of people using cyberspace and the ways they can use
it have dramatically increased, governments have attempted to regulate
speech in cyberspace through various means. In the United States, the
• Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law; Ph.D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology; J.D. , Yale Law School; B.A., Williams College. Thanks to
James Boyle, William Eskridge, Owen Fiss, Katherine Franke, Janet Halley, Elizabeth
Hillman, Morris Kaplan, Jerry Kang, Daphne Keller, Steve Lin, Stephen Munzer, William
Rubenstein, Rose Saxe, and Kenji Yoshino for provocative conversations, helpful suggestions, and comments on earlier drafts of this Article. This Article was completed while I
was on leave from Cardozo working as a law clerk for the Honorable Judge Dolores
Sloviter of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Judge Sloviter and my
co-clerks, Forrest Alogna and Dahlia Fetouh, provided a supportive, engaging, enriching,
and collegial work environment. Versions of this Article were presented at UCLA Law
School, Rutgers-Camden Law School, and the Law, Culture and Humanities Conference
held in March 2002 at the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
1 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm' n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (citation omitted).
2 Ben Greenman, Liar Liar, YAHOO! INTERNET LIFE, Mar. 1999, at 89, 91 (quoting
Professor Jerry Kang, UCLA Law School).
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most notable examples are the Communications Decency Act (CDA), 3
the Children 's Online Protection Act (COPA), 4 and the Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA). 5 Several states have also passed laws or instituted policies that seek to regulate speech in cyberspace, 6 and further
governmental efforts to do so can be expected. 7

3 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)-(e) (2000). Subsections (a)(l)(B), (b), and (d)(l)-(2) of the statute were held unconstitutional by ACLU v. Reno, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), aff 'g 929 F. Supp.
824 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ("ACLU v. Reno I") .
4
47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000). A preliminary injunction aga inst enforcement of thi s section
was granted by a district court. ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999)
("ACLU v. Reno II"). Although the di strict court's decision was upheld by the Third Circuit, the Supreme Court, though refusing to decide whether the statute might be unconstitutional on other grounds, overruled the Third Circuit's limited grounds for affirming the
uncon stitutionality of thi s section and remanded to that court for further proceedings. See
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 122 S. Ct. 1700, 1713-14 (2002), vacating ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d
162 (3d Cir. 2000). The Court did not, however, vacate the di strict court's preliminary
injunction, and the federal government remains enjoined from enforcing the statute during
the pendency of the Third Circuit's further proceedings. Id.
5
20 U.S.C. § 9 I 34(f) (2000); 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6) (2000). Pursuant to a provision in
the Children's Online Protection Act allowing for immediate review of the constitutionality
of the Act by a three-judge panel, followed by direct appeal to the United States Supreme
Court, a three-judge panel found these section s uncon stitutional as a violation of the First
Amendment; the Supreme Court's review of that deci sio n is pending. Am. Library Ass ' n v.
United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002), prob. juris. noted, 2002 WL 31060372
(U.S. Nov. 12, 2002) (No. 02-361 ).
• See, e.g., GA . CODE ANN. § 16-9-93. l(a) ( 1999) (prohibiting the use of a computer to
fa lsely identify the user) (law preliminarily enjoined on free speech grounds, ACLU v.
Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228 (N. D. Ga. 1997)); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.675 (West
1993 & Supp. 2002) (banning di stribution of sexually explicit material to minors over the
Internet) (state preliminarily enjoined from enforcement on First Amendment and Commerce Clause grounds, Cyberspace Communications, Inc. v. Engler, 55 F. Supp. 2d 737
(E. D. Mich. 1999), aff'd, 238 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 2000)) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-37-3.2(A)
(M ichie Supp. 2002) (prohibiting di ssemination by computer of materi al that is harmful to
a minor) (preliminary injunction against enforcement of statute on First Amendment and
Commerce Clause ground s upheld, ACLU v. John son, 194 F.3d 1149 ( I 0th Cir. 1999),
aff 'g 4 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (D.N.M . 1998)); N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 235 .21(3) (McKinney 2000)
(prohibiting intentionally engaging in communication with a minor that "depicts actual or
simulated nudity [or] sex ual conduct ... and which is harmful to minors") (law preliminarily enjoined on Commerce Clause grounds, Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp.
160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)); VA . CODE ANN. § 2.2-2827 (Michie 2001) (recodification of VA.
CODE ANN. § 2. 1-804 to -806 (Michie Supp. 2000)) (prohibiting state employees from
accessing sexually explicit material on computers owned or leased by the state) (section
initially held uncon stitutional on First Amendment grounds but then found constitutional
by the Fourth Circuit on appellate review, Urofsky v. Allen, 995 F. Supp. 634 (E.D. Va.
1998), rev'd en bane sub nom. Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 531 U.S . 1070 (2001)); VA . CODE ANN. § 18.2-391 (Michie Supp. 2002) (prohibiting intentional di splay of sex ually explicit material to minors for commercial purposes)
(permanently enjoined on First Amendment and Commerce Clause grounds, PSINet, Inc .
v. Chapman, 167 F. Supp. 2d 878 (W.D. Va. 2001)); see also Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd.
of Trs. of the Loudoun County Library, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552 (E. D. Va. 1998) (finding a library's policy requiring the use of filtering software on computers available for public
access to be uncon stitution al).
1
See, e.g., Assemb. B. 151 , 2001-2002 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 200 I) (proposing state law
si milar to CIPA); S.B. 3414, 224th Ann. Legi s. Sess. (N.Y. 2001) (proposing a prohibition
on using library computers to access obscene material or child pornography) ; H.B. 8,
124th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2001), enacted as OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
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This Article focuses on a community that is particularly affected by
the regulation of speech in cyberspace, 8 namely lesbians, gay men, and
other sexual minorities. 9 It argues that protecting the speech of lesbians,
gay men and other sexual minorities is at the heart of the First Amendment and that attempts to regulate such speech should be closely scrutinized. This Article suggests that the regulation of speech in cyberspace
uniquely impacts lesbian and gay speech and concludes that such regulation should be subject to close judicial scrutiny.
Given the pervasive effects of regulation on the lesbian and gay
community, it is unsurprising that among the litigants challenging almost
every attempt to regulate speech in cyberspace in the United States have
been lesbians and gay men, the businesses that serve them, or the organizations that represent their interests. Among those challenging the CDA
in ACLU v. Reno I were the Queer Resources Directory, an online resource for lesbians, gay men and other sexual minorities, and an AIDS
education group that maintains a Web site. 10 Among those challenging
COPA in ACLU v. Reno II were A Different Light Bookstore, a gay and
lesbian bookstore that maintains a Web site, Blackstripe, a Web-based
resource for African American lesbians and gay men, Philadelphia Gay
News, a newspaper serving the lesbian and gay community that also publishes online, and Planet Out, an online content provider serving the les§ 2907.0l(J) (West, WESTLAW through Oct. I, 2002, including File 185 of 125th Gen.
Assemb. (2001-2002)) (expanding the definition of material in sex offense laws to include,
inter alia, any image appearing on a computer monitor, recorded on a computer disk, or
transmitted using the Internet) .
8 Legal scholars have examined the effects of cyberspace on women and racial minorities. See, e.g., Anita L. Allen, Gender and Privacy in Cyberspace , 52 STAN. L. REV. 1175
(2000); Margaret Chon, Erasing Race ?: A Critical Race Feminist View of Internet ldentityShifting, 3 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 439 (2000); Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 HARV. L.
REV. I 130 (2000). Somewhat related to some of the themes discussed herein is Seth F.
Kreimer, Technologies of Protest: Insurgent Social Movements and the First Amendment in
the Era of the Internet, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 130 (2001).
9 In addition to particularly affecting lesbians and gay men, the regulation of speech in
cyberspace will also have distinctive impact on bisexuals, transgendered people (people
whose sex and sexual identity are di scordant), and intersexuals (people who have some
male and some female physical/anatomical characteristics). See EDWARD STEIN, THE MisMEASURE OF DESIRE : THE SCIENCE, THEORY, AND ETHICS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION 24-38
(1999) (discussing the differences among sexual minorities). See generally BERNICE L.
HAUSMAN, CHANGING SEX: TRANSSEXUALISM, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE IDEA OF GENDER
(1995); SUZANNE J. KESSLER, LESSONS FROM THE lNTERSEXED (1998); Kenji Yoshino, The
Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 353 (2000). In this Article I
focus for the most part on lesbians and gay men but will often use the phrase "lesbians,
gay men, and other sexual minorities" to encompass these other groups of people. Typically, even when I use the more restrictive phrase, I mean to include sexual minorities
generally. For reasons discussed infra note 123, I do not include people who engage in sex
between adults and children. Whether and to what extent other sexual minorities, such as
people who engage in sadomasochistic sex, are similarly situated to lesbians and gay men
is a question beyond the scope of this Article.
10
See ACLU v. Reno I, 929 F. Supp. 824, 827 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, 521 U.S. 844
(1997). See generally Queer Resources Directory, at http://www.qrd.org (last visited Nov.
9, 2002); Critical Path Project, at http://www.critpath.org (last visited Nov. 9, 2002) .
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bian and gay community. 11 Among those challenging CIPA in American
Library Ass'n v. United States are Planet Out, Out in America, a company that runs over sixty Web sites for lesbians, gay men and other sexual minorities, and a young lesbian who accesses the Internet from a
public library. 12 The same pattern emerges among many of the challenges
to state laws and policies. 13
Attempts to regulate cyberspace are of special concern to sexual minorities. Many lesbians and gay men find cyberspace to be an important
source of information, a useful way of community and political organizing, a congenial and entertaining way of spending time, and a potential
medium for meeting friends, lovers, and sexual partners. 14 For those who
are isolated from other lesbians and gay men in the "real" (that is, physical, non-cyber) world, cyberspace provides a virtual community that constitutes an emotional lifeline. The relative anonymity of cyberspace is
ideal for lesbians and gay men who are not open about their sexual orientation and for people who are exploring their sexuality. Cyberspace
provides opportunities for which lesbians and gay men as a group, more

11 See ACLU v. Reno II, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 485, 492 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (for this case's
complicated procedural history, see supra note 4). See generally A Different Light Bookstore, at http://www.adlbooks.com (last visited Nov. 9, 2002); Blackstripe, at http://www.
blackstripe.com (last visited Nov. 9, 2002); PHILA. GAY NEWS, at http://www.epgn.com
(last visited Nov. 9, 2002); Planet Out, at http://www.planetout.com (last visited Nov. 9, 2002).
12 See Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 415-16 (E.D. Pa.
2002), prob. juris. noted, 2002 WL 31060372 (U.S. Nov. 12, 2002) (No. 02-361).
13 See, e.g., PSINet, Inc. v. Chapman, 108 F. Supp. 2d 611,613 (W.D. Va. 2000) (listing as among the plaintiffs A Different Light Bookstore and the Lambda Rising Bookstore,
both gay and lesbian bookstores that have maintained or do maintain Web sites, and Susie
Bright, a columnist who writes about lesbian sex and other gay issues and maintains a Web
site at http://www.susiebright.com (last visited Nov. 9, 2002)); Cyberspace Communications, Inc. v. Engler, 55 F. Supp. 2d 737, 746 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (listing as among the
plaintiffs GLAD Day Bookshop, a store specializing in lesbian and gay books, with a Web
site at http://www.gladdaybookshop.com (last visited Nov. 9, 2002), and the AIDS Partnership of Michigan, which had maintained a Web site), aff'd, 238 F.2d 420 (6th Cir. 2000);
ACLU v. Johnson, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1032 (D.N .M . 1998) (noting that among the activities in which the plaintiffs engage is providing online resources for lesbian and gay youth),
aff'd, 194 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999); Urofsky v. Allen, 995 F. Supp. 634, 635 (E.D. Va.
1998) (listing as among the plaintiffs Professor Heller, who conducted research on lesbian
and gay studies using a state university's computer), rev 'd en bane sub nom. Urofsky v.
Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1070 (2001); Mainstream
Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. of Loudoun County Library, 24 F. Supp. 2d. 552, 557 (E.D. Va.
1998) (listing as among the plaintiffs Books for Gay and Lesbian Teens/Youth, which
maintains a Web site at http://www.youth.org/yao/docs/books.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2002),
and The Renaissance Transgender Association, the Web address of which is http://www.
ren.org (last visited Nov. 9, 2002)); ACLU v. Miller, No. 96-cv-2475-MHS, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1446, at *1 (N.D. Ga. June 20, 1997) (listing as among the plaintiffs Atlanta
Veterans Alliance, a group for gay veterans); Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp.
160, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (listing as among the plaintiffs New York City Net, a for-profit
Internet service provider catering primarily to lesbians and gay men in the New York area).
14 See JEFF DAWSON, GAY AND LESBIAN ONLINE: YOUR INDISPENSABLE GUIDE TO
CRUISING THE QUEER WEB (4th ed. 2000); Jennifer Egan, Lonely Gay Teen Seeking Same,
N .Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2000, § 6 (Magazine), at 110; Steve Friess, Cyber Activism, AovoCATE, Mar. 2, 1999, at 35.
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than heterosexuals as a group, have a particular need. This Article therefore focuses on the intersection of the First Amendment, cyberspace, and
the social and legal circumstances of lesbians and gay men.
Laws that restrict the expression of lesbians and gay men in cyberspace disrupt one of the central functions of the First Amendment,
namely "to protect . . . unpopular individuals from retaliation . . . and
their ideas from suppression." 15 While all non-dominant groups, including women and racial minorities, are affected by attempts to regulate cyberspace, 16 restrictions on anonymity uniquely affect "closeted" lesbians,
gay men, and other sexual minorities. When governments regulate cyberspace, th~ must consider the impact of potential legislation on lesbians
and gay men and safeguard against the suppression of unpopular groups
and ideas; when courts evaluate these regulations, they should subject efforts
to limit the speech of lesbians and gay men to close judicial scrutiny.
My discussion will proceed as follows. In Part II, I discuss cyberspace and attempts to regulate it. In Part III, I survey the social and legal
conditions for lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals in the United States and
look at how these conditions are manifest in cyberspace. In Part IV, I explore the ways in which courts have dealt with the speech of sexual minorities. While I show that since the middle of the twentieth century,
speech concerning homosexuality and the speech of lesbians and gay
men have, for the most part, been protected by the First Amendment, I
focus on the exceptions to this protection. In Part V, I discuss anonymous
speech. In particular, I examine the Supreme Court's holding that the
protection of at least some anonymous speech is an important part of the
right to free speech. In Part VI, drawing on the three preceding Parts, I
argue that the First Amendment fundamentally protects lesbians and gay
men who speak "from the closet," that is, who speak anonymously or
pseudonymously. In Part VII, I argue that when lesbians and gay men
speak openly rather than from the closet, their speech is political and
thus also central to the First Amendment. In Part VIII, I apply the conclusions of the two preceding Parts to cyberspace and suggest that the
speech of lesbians and gay men in cyberspace, whether anonymous or
not, deserves special protection. I demonstrate how these conclusions
build upon judicial responses to governmental attempts to regulate cyberspace. I argue that restrictions on the speech of lesbians and gay men,
particularly in cyberspace, undermine the First Amendment and should
therefore be subject to heightened judicial scrutiny.

15

16

McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comrn' n, 514 U.S. 334,357 (1995).
See, e.g., supra note 8.
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REGULATE IT

A. Cyberspace Defined

"Cyberspace" is a catchall phrase for computer-mediated communication; it is the "location" of various electronic interactions. Cyberspace
includes communication on and through the Internet, the World Wide
Web, electronic mail, Usenet discussion groups, chat rooms, the exchange of digitized images, video, and sounds, as well as other modes of
communication. In cyberspace, individuals can, inter alia, shop, bank,
conduct research, make friends, keep in touch with family, and engage in
political activism. The possibilities for communication in cyberspace are
expanding rapidly. 17
Those who have reservations about speaking openly can participate
in almost all of the activities in cyberspace anonymously or pseudonymously. 18 A user of cyberspace can adopt a pseudonym and decline to
"attach" any information (or at least any true information) about herself-such as her name, hometown, race, or sexual interests-to this
pseudonym. It is usually possible for the state or a motivated, cybersavvy individual to locate the person behind the pseudonym. There are,
however, various privacy tools that make such tracing difficult. 19
B. Attempts To Regulate Cyb.ff)-space

Faced with growing numbers of cyberspace services and users, Congress has attempted to limit certain types of communication in cyberspace. In 1996, Congress enacted the Communications Decency Act
(CDA). In general, this Act sought to protect minors from indecent and
patently offensive communications in cyberspace by prohibiting anyone
from sending or displaying indecent or obscene messages to people under
the age of eighteen. 20 In ACLU v. Reno/, the Supreme Court struck down
17 For a canonical judicial discussion of cyberspace, see ACLU v. Reno I, 929 F. Supp.
824, 830-38 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (containing extensive findings of fact concerning the nature
of cyberspace), aff'd, 521 U.S. 844, 849-57 (1997) (containing a summary of same).
18 Pseudonyrnity allows an individual to use a name other than her own in cyberspace.
This provides limited anonymity because pseudonyms can typically be traced back to the
user (with varying degrees of difficulty). Something closer to complete anonymity can be
provided through various technological means, including so-called anonymous remailers.
See Noah Levine, Note, Establishing Legal Accountability for Anonymous Communication
in Cyberspace, 96 CoLUM. L. REY. 1526, 1528 n.9 (1996). Henceforth, I use the word
"anonymity" to encompass pseudonymity.
19 See, e.g., Anonyrnizer.com, at http://www.anonymizer.com (providing access to
downloadable software, including a version that is free of charge, that allows users to send
e-mail, post messages, and access Web sites anonymously-that is, without allowing for
the possibility that the activities can be traced back to the user); see also Shawn C. Helms,
Translating Privacy Values with Technology , 1 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH . L. 288, 316 (2001),
available at http://www.bu.edu/law/scitech/volume7/Helms.pdf.
20
The statute reads in part:
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the CDA on the grounds that it violated the First Amendment protection
of speech. 21 The Court held that the CDA was overly broad because it
unduly restricted adult access in order to protect children22 and because it
regulated "indecent" speech protected by the First Amendment along
with obscene speech, 23 which is not protected by the First Amendment. 24
Further, the Court held that the CDA violated the First Amendment because, although the government's interest in protecting children is compelling, there are less restrictive ways of attempting to protect children
than those adopted by the CDA. 25
Congress responded to the Supreme Court's decision in ACLU v.
Reno I with the Child Online Protection Act (COPA). This Act prohibited
the following conduct:
Whoever knowingly
in interstate or foreign commerce by
means of the World Wide Web, makes any communication for
commercial purposes that is available to any minor and that includes material that is harmful to minors shall be fined not more
than $50,000, imprisoned not more than six months, or both. 26
COPA defines material harmful to minors as:

(a) Whoever (l) in interstate or foreign communications ... (B) by means of a
telecommunications device knowingly (i) makes, creates, or solicits, and (ii) initiates
the transmission of, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other
communication which is obscene or indecent, knowing that the recipient of the
communication is under 18 years of age, regardless of whether the maker of such
communication placed the call or initiated the communication; ... (2) knowingly
permits any telecommunications facility under his control to be used for any activity prohibited by paragraph (I) with the intent that it be used for such activity,
shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both . . ..
(d) Whoever (I) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly (A) uses an
interactive computer service to send to a specific person or persons under 18 years
of age, or (B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner available to a person under 18 years of age, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in
terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or oljgans, regardless of whether the user of such service
placed the call or initiated the-'communication; or (2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under such person's control to be used for an activity
prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used for such activity, shall
be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
47 U.S.C. § 223(a), (d) (2000).
21 See ACLU v. Reno I, 521 U.S. 544, 870 (1997).
22
Id. at 874-75.
23
See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (defining obscenity as explicitly
sexual speech that primarily appeals to prurient interest in sex, that is offensive to community standards, and that lacks serious literary, scientific, artistic, or political value).
24 ACLU v. Reno I, 521 U.S. at 871.
25
Id. at 878-79.
26 47 u.s.c. § 231 (2000).
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[A]ny communication, picture, image, graphic image file, article, recording, writing, or other matter of any kind that is obscene or that (A) the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, would find, taking the material as a whole
and with respect to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is designed to pander to, the prurient interest; (B) depicts, describes,
or represents, in a manner patently offensive with respect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an actual or simulated normal or perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent female breast; and
(C) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value for minors. 27
Various plaintiffs filed suit to prevent the enforcement of COPA, arguing
that the statute was unconstitutional. The district court granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting the enforcement of COPA on the grounds that
it violated the First Amendment, 28 finding that COPA imposed a
significant burden on the speech of people who make use of cyberspace
and that it failed to use the least restrictive means for doing so. The Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed on the grounds that the statute
was overbroad insofar as it gauged harm to minors by contemporary
community standards.29
In a highly fractured opinion, the Supreme Court vacated that decision and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals. Justice Thomas '
opinion, only part of which commanded a five-judge majority, focused on
the "narrow question [of] whether [COPA's] use of 'community standards' to identify 'material that is harmful to minors' violates the First

21

Id. § 23 l(e)(6) .
ACLU v. Reno II, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
29 ACLU v. Reno II, 217 F.3d 162, 173- 74 (3d Cir. 2000), vacated and remanded sub
nom. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 122 S.Ct. 1700 (2002). The Third Circuit explicitly did not reach
other issues addressed by the district court below :
28

[W]e do not find it necessary to address the District Court's analysis of the
definition of "commercial purposes" ; whether the breadth of the forms of content
covered by COPA could have been more narrowly tailored; whether the
affirmative defenses impose too great' a burden on web publishers or whether
those affirmative defenses should have been included as elements of the crime itself; whether COPA's inclusion of criminal as well as civil penalties was excessive; whether COPA is designed to include communications made in chat rooms,
discussion groups and links to other websites; whether the government is entitled
to so restrict communications when children will continue to be able to access
foreign websites and other sources of material that is harmful to them; what taken
"as a whole" should mean in the context of the web and the Internet; or whether
the statute's failure to distinguish between material that is harmful to a six year
old versus a sixteen year old is problematic.

Id. at 174 n. 19. On remand, the Third Circuit will undoubtedly address these issues.
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Amendment." 30 The Court found that COPA's use of community standards did not render it facially unconstitutional and remanded the case
for further constitutional analysis of COPA. While eight of the justices
concurred in the result, only two judges joined Justice Thomas in the
most substantive sections of his opinion. 31
Because of the fractured nature of the Court's decision and the narrowness of its holding, it is difficult to discern what the Court will do if,
as seems likely, the Third Circuit, on remand, holds that COPA is unconstitutional on other grounds. Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion suggests that he and Justices Souter and Ginsburg have serious doubts about
COPA's constitutionality. 32 Justice Stevens, who dissented, would have
affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Justices Breyer and
O'Connor are likely to be the swing votes when, as seems inevitable,
COPA again reaches the Supreme Court. Their separate concurrences, both
of which focus on the constitutionality of a national standard for obscenity, do not provide much indication of their views on COPA as a whole. 33
Various states have passed laws like the CDA or COPA. For example, in 1999, Michigan passed a law that banned the distribution of sexually explicit material to minors over the Internet. 34 In Cyberspace Communications, Inc. v. Engler, this law was preliminarily enjoined against
enforcement on the basis that it likely violated the First Amendment and
the Commerce Clause. 35 Other such state laws have been enjoined on
similar grounds. 36
C. Filtering

Various courts, in addressing the constitutionality of the CDA,
COPA, and similar state laws have found that the use of filtering software
that blocks access to certain Web sites is a less restrictive means of fulfilling
the legitimate government interest in preventing children from accessing
30 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 122 S. Ct. 1700, 1703 (2002). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia joined the entirety of Justice Thomas's opinion. Justice O'Connor joined parts I,
II, and IV, as well as part lll-B. Justice Breyer joined parts I, II, and IV.
31 See id. at 1708-13 (Part III, sections A, B, and D, of Justice Thomas's opinion were
joined only by Justices Rehnquist and Scalia); id. at 1714 (O' Connor, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment); id. at 1715 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment); id. at 1716 (Kennedy, J ., joined by Souter, J., and Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment).
32 /d. at 1716 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) ("There is a very real likelihood that [COPA] is overbroad and cannot survive [a facial] challenge."); id. at 1722
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) ("The Court of Appeals[' ] .. . ultimate conclusion may prove correct. There may be grave doubts that COPA is consistent with the First
Amendment.").
33 See id. at 1715 (O' Connor, J ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment);
id. at 1716 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
34
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.675 (West 1993 & Supp. 2002).
35 55 F. Supp. 2d 737 (E.D. Mich. 1999), ajf'd, 238 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 2000).
36
See supra note 6.
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obscene and indecent material in cyberspace. 37 Such software allows individual parents to control their children's access to cyberspace. The
virtue of such software is that when parents are in control, the state need
neither restrict speech in cyberspace nor restrict access to cyberspace.
There are various types of filtering methods, of which the two most
frequently used are keyword blocking filters and site-blocking filters. The
less sophisticated type of filters search for certain undesirable ("dirty")
keywords or phrases and then remove these words or phrases from the
page or, alternatively, block pages containing such words. Such keyword
filters are unsophisticated because they unintentionally block out many
sites . For example, a filter that attempts to prevent access to sexually explicit Web sites by screening out the word "sex" would also screen out
Web pages with information about sextuplets and musical sextets, as well
as sexual orientation and perhaps even the Mars Explorer (in which the
letters "s," "e," and "x" are adjacent).38
More sophisticated are programs that use site-blocking filters (or
programs that combine such filters with "dirty word" blocking filters).
These types of filtering programs maintain lists of Web sites and either
(a) prohibit access to all the sites on the list ("black-list" filters) or
(b) permit access to only those sites on the list ("white-list" filters).
While each method faces serious limitations,39 white-list filters (like that
used by AOL in its "Young Teen" area40 ) provide greater assurance that
the filtered sites will be free of offending material, because each site has
been screened and then specifically included on the list of accessible
sites. However, these filtering methods are limited in that they only provide access to specified sites. New Web pages that have not yet been
scrutinized will also be blocked.

37

38

See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno I, 521 U.S . 844, 877 ( 1997).

An early version of the filtering program CYBERsitter did not actually block access to a
Web page because the page contained a prohibited word; rather, it displayed the page, but
ommitted the word. Because this version of the program included "homosexual" among its
"dirty words," a Web page that contained the sentence "The Catholic Church opposes homosexual marriage" would be rendered by CYBERsitter as "The Catholic Church opposes marriage." Peacefire, CYBERsitter Examined, at http://peacefire.org/censorware/CYBERsitter (last
visited Nov. 9, 2002); see also GAY & LESBIAN ALLIANCE AGAINST DEFAMATION, ACCESS
DENIED VERSION 2.0: THE CONTINUING THREAT AGAINST INTERNET ACCESS AND PRIVACY
AND ITS IMPACT ON THE LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER COMMUNITY 17 (Dec.
1999), available at http://www.glaad.org/org/binary-data/GLAAD_PDF/pdf_file/2.pdf [hereinafter ACCESS DENIED].
39
For a detailed general discussion of the limitations of filtering software, see American library Ass 'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 428-50 (E.D. Pa. 2002), prob.
juris. noted, 2002 WL 31060372 (U.S. Nov. 12, 2002) (No. 02-361).
40
Digital Chaperones for Kids , CONSUMER REP., Mar. 2001, at 20 [hereinafter Digital
Chaperones]. A similar filtering method was used in I 996 by a library in Westerville,
Ohio. Computers in the children's section of the library were restricted to a few thousand
sites chosen by librarians. After three years, the library stopped using this system because
it dramatically constrained the material children could access in cyberspace. See Am. library Ass 'n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 424-25.
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Both white-list and black-list filters must be constructed and maintained through human intervention. Because of the size of the Web and
the difficulties involved in rating each Web site and keeping the ratings
up-to-date, neither type of filter will be effective. White-list filters require
frequent maintenance to ensure that sites that were originally approved
do not add offending content; otherwise, they will fail to provide the
pristine content they purport to deliver. A huge staff would be necessary
to evaluate even a significant portion of existing Web sites to determine
which ones should be filtered. Even if such a staff could be assembled,
the people who do the screening would have to make subjective determinations about each site they screen. To do their job properly, the screeners would have to assess whether each site's content is appropriate for
different age groups and in light of varied filtering criteria. A siteblocking program that uses a black-list filter will probably not screen out
most offensive content. For example, in an independent study, the
filtering program Cybersnoop failed to block ninety percent of objectionable sites. 41 Additionally, most site-blocking software blocks access to
some lesbian and gay material, much of which is clearly not offensive. 42
Many states and the Federal government have turned to filtering
software, despite its limitations, in light of the negative judicial assessment of CDA, COPA and similar statutes. For example, the public libraries in Loudoun County, Virginia, as part of providing Internet access
to its patrons, installed such a program (a filtering program called XSTOP) on its public terminals. The library's policy for Internet access
provided, in part, that:
all library computers would be equipped with site-blocking
software to block all sites displaying ... child pornography and
obscene material; and ... material deemed harmful to juveniles;
... all library computers would be installed near or in full view
of library staff; [and that] ... patrons would not be permitted to
access pornography .... 43
A nonprofit organization, several county residents, and two Web pages
directed at sexual minorities filed suit in federal court challenging the
library's Internet policy, arguing that it violated their free speech rights.

Digital Chaperones, supra note 40.
See, e.g., Am. Library Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 445-47 (listing several Web sites
with gay and lesbian content in its discussion of erroneously blocked Web sites); ACCESS
DENIED, supra note 38; Lisa Guernsey, Sticks and Stones Can Hurt, but Bad Words Pay,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1999, at Gl (discussing filtering software and mentioning one widely
used program that prohibits access to any site that uses the phrase "gay rights"); see also
Digital Chaperones, supra note 40 (noting that some filters are likely to curb access to
Web sites that discuss political and social issues).
43
Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. of the Loudoun County Library, 24 F. Supp. 2d,
552, 556 (E.D. Va. 1998).
41

42
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The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that the library's
Internet access policy violated the First Amendment because, in part, it
restricted the access of adult patrons in order to protect minors and because it was neither necessary for nor narrowly tailored to any compelling state interest. 44
The decision in Mainstream Loudoun did not discourage Congress
from passing a law requiring use of filtering software. In 2000, Congress
passed the Children's Internet Protection Act ("CIPA"), 45 which requires
public schools and libraries to install filtering software that prohibits access to obscene material, child pornography, or material that is harmful
to minors, in order to be eligible for certain federal funding. 46 Library or
school personnel may disable the filtering software for certain adult users
who can demonstrate that they are engaged in a "bona fide research program"47 that requires unfiltered access to cyberspace, but neither provision defines a bona fide research program or says how library or school
personnel can make the necessary assessments of the proposed research
and do so in a way that protects users' privacy.
A three-judge panel recently found CIPA unconstitutional, applying
strict scrutiny to content-based restrictions on library patrons' access to
cyberspace. 48 The court held that the mandatory use of filtering software
is not narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest. 49
Specifically, the court found that the filtering software, because of its
technological limitations, "block[s] access to substantial amounts of constitutionally protected speech." 5° Further, the court found that while libraries do allow access to blocked sites when a library patron requests,
this method of dealing with the technological limitations of filtering programs "will deter many patrons because they are embarrassed, or desire
to protect their privacy or remain anonymous." 51 The fact that libraries
will disable filtering on request does not, according to the court, "cure
the constitutional deficiencies in public libraries' use of Internet filters." 52
Id. at 570.
Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000) (codified in various scattered sections of
the U.S. Code.)
46
Specifically, one portion of CIPA requires public libraries that receive federal funds
through a program designed to provide access to information services such as the Internet
to install filtering technology to prohibit access to obscene material, child pornography
and, if the computers involved are used by minors, material that is harmful to minors. 47
U.S.C. § 254 (2000). Another portion requires libraries that receive funding for computer
equipment or Internet access from the Library Services and Technology Act to take similar
measures. 20 U.S.C. § 9134 (2000).
47
20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(3); 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(5)(D) (2000).
48
Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 453-70 (E.D. Pa. 2002)
(discussing the level of scrutiny applicable to library use of filtering software), prob. juris.
noted, 2002 WL 31060372 (U.S. Nov. 12, 2002) (No. 02-361).
49 Id. at 470-84 (applying strict scrutiny).
so Id. at 410.
51 Id. at 411.
44

45

s2 1d.
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The court concluded that CIPA was facially invalid on First Amendment
grounds and enjoined its enforcement.
Ill. THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN
AND ITS LEGAL ENFORCEMENT

As background for the discussion of the impact on sexual minorities
of attempts to regulate cyberspace, I consider some features of the social
situation of lesbians, gay men and other sexual minorities in the United
States and their legal enforcement. In the United States, lesbians and gay
men face a hostile social environment. Although it seems beyond dispute,
Justice Scalia has sought to deny this reality, claiming that homosexuals
have both "high disposable income" and "political power much greater
than their numbers [that] ... they devote to achieving not merely a
grudging social toleration, but full social acceptance, of homosexuality."53 The following discussion endeavors to dispel skepticism like Justice Scalia's regarding the severity of anti-gay sentiment and structures in
the United States.

A. The Legal Situation of Lesbians and Gay Men
One way to assess the situation of lesbians and gay men is to examine the laws that are directed at them in particular. In the United States,
depending on how one counts, thirteen states as well as the military
(which is a separate criminal jurisdiction) have laws that criminalize
most forms of same-sex sexual activity. 54 Although no state regularly enforces these laws (called "sodomy" laws or laws regarding "unnatural"
sex acts) when adults privately and willingly engage in such activity, in
some states, these laws have been selectively applied to gay men and lesbians. 55 The Supreme Court has ruled, in Bowers v. Hardwick, 56 that the
Constitution allows states to prohibit consensual homosexual activity.
Laws against sexual activity between people of the same sex are often
used to support and justify other laws and social practices relating to homosexuality. 57 Criminal prohibitions relating to sexual activity between
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S . 620, 645-46 ( 1996) (Scalia, J ., dissenting).
Of these states, three (Kansas, Texas, and Oklahoma) have laws that criminalize
certain sexual acts only when committed by two people of the same sex. See KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-3505 (1995) ; OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 886 (2001 ); Tux. PENAL CooE ANN.
§ 21.06 (Vernon 1994); see also Lambda Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, State-by-State Map
of Sodomy Laws, at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/pages/states/sodomy-map (last
visited Nov. 9, 2002).
55 See, e.g., Diana Hassel, The Use of Criminal Sodomy Laws in Civil Litigation, 79
Tux. L. REV. 813, 822 n.56 (2001) ; Christopher Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries
Inflicted by Un enforced Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV . 103, 108 n.31 (2000).
56 478 U.S. 186,186 (1986).
57 For example, in Padula v. Webster, to defend a ban on lesbians and gay men working
for the Federal Bureau of Investigation against an equal protection challenge, the D.C.
53

54
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people of the same sex restrict sexual behaviors and enforce negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men.58
Not only is sex between people of the same sex criminalized, lesbians, gay men and bisexuals are also subject to a multitude of discriminatory practices. For example, it is legal in thirty-nine states for a non-state
entity to discriminate in hiring and housing on the basis of sexual orientation.59 In many states, lesbians and gay men face difficulties (often insurmountable) adopting children and, in Florida, they are simply prohibited as a matter of law from adopting. 60 Additionally, no state provides
lesbian and gay relationships with the same legal recognition it provides
heterosexual marriages; even Vermont, which has been the most progressive state in recognizing same-sex relationships, created an independent
category of "civil unions" rather than providing same-sex couples access
to the institution of marriage.6 1 Moreover, same-sex couples who obtain
civil unions in Vermont do not receive the federal benefits that accrue to
married couples,62 and their relationship may not be recognized in other

Circuit Court cited the Supreme Court's decision in Bowers. Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d
97 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The circuit court said, " It would be quite anomalous, on its face, to
declare status defined by conduct that states may constitutionally criminalize as deserving
of strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause." Id. at 103.
58
See, e. g., Hassel, supra note 55 ; Leslie, supra note 55 .
59 See, e.g., Edward Stein, Evaluating the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian
and Gay Rights, 49 UCLA L. REV. 471,475 n.13 (2001). Title VII does not prevent private
employers from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation. See, e. g. , Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that Title VII does not prohibit
discrimination on the basis of effeminacy); Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290, 1992 WL 5436
(6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992); Ruth v. Children's Med. Ctr., No. 90-4069, 1991 WL 151158 (6th
Cir. Aug. 8, 1991); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1989)
(per curiam). Various scholars have argued against this interpretation of Title VII. See, e.g. ,
Samuel Marcosson, Harassment on the Basis of Sexual Orientation: A Claim of Sex Discrimination Under Title VII, 81 GEO. L.J. l (1992); Bennett Capers, Sex(ual Orientation)
and Title VII, 91 CoLUM. L. REV. 1158 (1991). For now, legislative change seems the most
promising strategy for protecting against employment discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2001, H.R. 2692, 107th Cong.
(2001) (proposing to amend Title VII to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination in most
employment contexts).
60 FLA. STAT. ch. 63 .042(3) (2001). This law was recently upheld against a constitutional challenge in Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (S .D. Fla. 2001).
6 1 See, e. g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND TH E
FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS (2002) ; WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE (1996) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE].
62 1 U.S .C. § 7 (2000) ("[T]he word 'marriage' means only a legal union between one
man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word ' spouse' refers only to a person of
the opposite sex who is a husband or wife.").
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states. 63 Outside Vermont, same-sex couples are denied access to the vast
majority of the rights and privileges that marriage offers. 64
The legal asymmetries surrounding sexual orientation are not limited
to the rights and privileges withheld from gay and lesbian individuals.
Rather, they extend to lesbian and gay institutions and community structures. For example, various public schools have denied funding to lesbian
and gay student organizations. 65 In addition, plays, photographs, and
other forms of artistic expression that reflect lesbian and gay culture have
been prohibited from receiving government support. 66 In fact, representations of and by lesbians and gay men have played a central role in debates over government funding of the arts and public standards of "decency."67
Finally, despite the discrimination faced by lesbians and gay men,
past and present, current Supreme Court case law does not afford sexual
orientation heightened scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause, as it does for classifications based on race, ethnicity,
national origin, sex, alienage, and legitimacy. 68 While the Supreme Court
has not directly ruled on the question of whether sexual-orientation

63 See 28 U.S.C. § l738C (2000) (providing that a state does not have to give full faith
and credit to a same-sex marriage legally performed in another state) ; Burns v. Burns, 560
S.E.2d 47 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that a Georgia woman who obtained a civil union
in Vermont with her same-sex partner was nevertheless bound by a court decree denying
visitation with her children from a previous marriage while "cohabiting" with an adult to ·
whom she is neither married nor related).
64
See, e.g.• ESKRIDGE, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 61, at 6~7.
65
See, e. g. , E. High Gay/Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ. of Salt Lake City Sch. Dist. ,
81 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (D. Utah 1999) (finding no violation of 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (2000), a
provision of the Equal Access Act, when, in response to the formation of a gay high school
student group, the school board barred all "non-curriculum-related" student groups); see
also Colin v. Orange Unified Sch. Dist. , 83 F. Supp. 2d 1135 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (granting
preliminary injunction after finding that the school board's denial of a gay group's request
for recognition was likely a violation of the Equal Access Act); E. High Sch. Prism Club v.
Seidel, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1239 (D. Utah 2000) (granting preliminary injunction on the basis
that a gay student group was likely curriculum-related and had thus probably been improperly prevented from organizing and meeting on school property).
66 See, e.g., Nat'! Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (upholding a
"decency" clause in the NEA's governing statute against a First Amendment challenge by
artists, including some lesbian and gay artists).
67 See, e.g., Nancy Knauer, Homosexuality as Contagion: From the Well of Loneliness
to the Boy Scouts, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 401 , 495-96 ("Congress and executive agencies
have imposed conditions on state-funded speech mandating that it cannot be offensive or
outside the bounds of 'general standards of decency.' Often, the decision to include such a
subjective standard was intentionally designed to disqualify expressions of same-sex desire.").
68 See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S . 356 (1886) (heightened scrutiny for ethnic
classification); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (heightened scrutiny for national
origin); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218-23 (1982) (heightened scrutiny for alienage);
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (heightened scrutiny for legitimacy); Miss. Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24 (1982) (heightened scrutiny for gender).

174

Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review

[Vol. 38

classifications deserve heightened scrutiny, most lower courts that have
considered the question have held that they do not. 69
However, the Supreme Court's decision in Romer v. Evans is instructive.70 In Romer, the Court struck down an amendment to the Colorado Constitution. The amendment, which was approved by a state-wide
voter referendum, repealed various city ordinances in Colorado that prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and, further,
prohibited any state or local government from passing laws that would
protect lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals from such discrimination. 71 The
Court explicitly did not reach the question of whether sexual orientations
deserve heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Rather, it held that the Colorado constitutional
amendment failed to pass constitutional muster even under rational review, a weaker standard of judicial scrutiny. Justice Kennedy wrote for
the majority:
First, the amendment has the peculiar property of imposing a
broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named group,
an exceptional and, as we shall explain, invalid form of legislation. Second, its sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the rea69
Several cases have explicitly refused to grant heightened scrutiny for sexual orientation classifications. See, e.g., Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989)
(refusing to grant heightened scrutiny for sexual orientation classifications in the context of
the military's policy on homosexuality); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076
(Fed. Cir. 1989) (same); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (same in the
context of the FBI); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996) (en bane) (same in
the context of the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy). There have been rare exceptions to these decisions, though all have been vacated or reversed on appeal. See, e.g. , Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that sexual orientation
classifications deserve heightened scrutiny and, under this standard of review, that the U.S.
military's pre-1992 policy of discharging homosexuals was unconstitutional), withdrawn ,
875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane); High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance
Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that classifications based on homosexuality or perceived homosexuality deserve heightened scrutiny under equal protection),
rev'd, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990); Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1546 (D. Kan. 1991)
(same), rev'd, 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992); see also Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch.
Dist., 470 U.S. 1009 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (dissenting from denial of writ of
certiorari on grounds that discrimination against homosexuals ra:ses significant equal protection concerns).
70 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S . 620 (1996).
71
The amendment at issue in Romer reads, in part:

Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any
of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall
constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to
have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of
discrimination.

Cow. CoNST. art. II, § 30b.
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sons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by
anything but animus toward the class that it affects; it lacks a
rational relationship to legitimate state interests. 72
Some scholars have read Romer as suggesting that the Court is in
fact applying a somewhat heightened standard of review to sexualorientation classifications, one either equivalent to the intermediate standard of review it applies to gender classifications, 73 which is a somewhat
less searching review than strict scrutiny,74 or a standard in between mere
rational review and conventional intermediate scrutiny-what some have
called "rational review with bite."75 Given the highly deferential nature of
rational basis review, it seems clear that the Court in Romer had a more
rigorous test in mind. Perhaps Romer indicates that heightened scrutiny
for sexual orientation is just around the corner. In the meantime, however, various federal courts have applied rational basis review in scrutinizing statutory classifications based on sexual orientation. While some
of them have invalidated sexual-orientation discrimination, 76 others have
found that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is constitutionally legitimate. 77

B. Social Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men
Legal matters aside, social attitudes toward lesbians and gay men
and other sexual minorities, while improving in significant ways, remain
predominantly negative. Violence against lesbians and gay men is not

Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
See, e.g. , Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (striking down a state law permitting
girls to buy low-alcohol beer at a younger age than boys because it made use of sex-based
classifications).
74 But see United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (noting that the
justification of a law that makes use of sex-based classifications must be "exceedingly
persuasive").
75 See, e.g., Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Rational Basis With Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by
Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J . 779 ( 1987).
76 Several federal courts have issued decisions that used the rational review standard to
overturn laws that make use of sexual orientation classifications. See, e.g., Stemler v. City
of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 873-74 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that selective prosecution based
on sexual orientation fail s rational review); Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 458 (7th
Cir. 1996) (holding, in part, that there was no "rational basis for permitting one student to
assault another based on the victim's sexual orientation"); Glover v. Williamsburg Local
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (holding that the decision
not to rehire a teacher based solely on sexual orientation fails rational review); Weaver v.
Nebo Sch. Dist. , 29 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (D. Utah 1998) (holding that the decision not to reassign a public school teacher to coach a volleyball team based on her sexual orientation fails
rational review).
77
See, e.g., Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289 (6th
Cir. 1997); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989); Beller v. Middendorf,
632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980).
12

73
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uncommon. 78 Such violence is often quite severe, as several hate-crime
murders of gay men and lesbians in the past few years have graphically
demonstrated. 79 The prevailing intolerance toward sexual minorities
manifests itself in low self-esteem in many lesbians and gay men, especially young ones. As striking evidence of this trend, lesbian and gay
teenagers are two to three times more likely to attempt suicide than their
heterosexual counterparts.80
While national opinion polls indicate that attitudes toward lesbians
and gay men are becoming more favorable over time, over forty percent
of the population still believes that homosexuality is not an acceptable
lifestyle and that same-sex sexual relations between consenting adults
should be illegal. 8 1 Further, over half of the population opposes laws that
would give same-sex couples some of the legal rights of married couples. 82 A recent poll found that approximately fifty-six percent of adult
Americans disapprove of homosexual couples adopting children. 83 Various polls have suggested that substantially more than half of adult
Americans would be "upset" or "very upset" if their college-age child
said he or she was gay or lesbian .84 Read together, these polls demon78 See, e.g., GARY DAVID COMSTOCK, VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN
(1991).
79 See Troy A. Scotting, Hate Crimes and the Need for Stronger Federal Legislation,
34 Akron L. Rev. 853, 887-89 (2001) ; Henry F. Fradella et al., Sexual Orientation, Justice,
and High er Education: Student Attitudes Towards Gay Civil Rights and Hate Crimes, 11 L.
& SEXUALITY 11 , 14 (2002).
80 Paul Gibson, Gay and Lesbian Youth Suicide, in SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND TH E
LAW 289 (William Rubenstein ed. , 1997); see also Stephen Russell & Kara Joyner, Adolescent Sexual Orientation and Suicide Risk: Evidence from a National Study, 91 AM . J.
Pua. HEALTH 1276 (2001).
8 1 Frank Newport, In Depth Analyses: Homosexuality, GALLUP POLL NEWS, Sept. ,
2002, (finding that, in May 2002, 51 % of surveyed individuals said that " homosexuality
should be considered an accepted alternative lifestyle," compared to 34% in 1982, and that
52% said that "homosexual relations between consenting adults should . . . be legal," compared to 43 % in 1977), available at http://gallup.com/poll/analysis/ia0209 I I .asp. A 1998
Gallup poll found that 59% of American adults believe "homosexual behavior is morally
wrong." GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1998, at 89 (1999).
This question does not seem to have been asked more recently.
82 See Newport, supra note 81 (finding that 46% of those surveyed in 2001 and 5 I% of
,
those surveyed in 2002 would "oppose a law that would allow homosexual couples to legally form civil unions, giving them some of the legal rights of married couples").
83 Humphrey Taylor, Attitudes To Gays and Lesbians Have Become More Accepting, but
Most People Still Disapprove of Single-Sex Marriages and Adoption by Same Sex Couples,
THE HARRIS POLL #9, Feb. 9, 2000 (reporting the results of a poll of over a thousand adults
taken in January 2000), at http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID= 1.
Similarly, a 1997 poll found that 57% of Americans were opposed to allowing male couples
to adopt children and 55% were opposed to allowing female couples to do so. Richard
Berke, Chasing the Polls on Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1998, § 4 (Week in Review),
at 3.
84 See, e.g. , Alan Yang, Attitudes Towards Homosexuality , 61 PUB. OPINION Q . 477,
479 (1997) ("When asked how they would react if their child told them they were homosexual, large, stable majorities of respondents (over two-thirds) said they would not be
accepting and think the rel_ationship with the child would be very much strained or they
would be ' very upset."'); Jeffrey Sch~alz, Poll Finds Even Split on Homosexuality's
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strate that even people who are sympathetic to lesbian and gay rights and
who do not think homosexual conduct should be illegal continue to perceive homosexuality as a negative trait. In fact, many parents have taken
extreme measures to ensure that their children do not grow up to be lesbians or gay men. 85
C. The Closet

There is a further, related, feature of lesbian and gay existence in the
United States that warrants attention: lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals
are, in a variety of ways-some subtle, some not-encouraged to keep
their sexual orientations secret, that is, "in the closet." The closet is a
distinctive, pervasive, and, some have argued, singular feature of lesbian
and gay existence. 86 Its effects are easily underestimated. People remain
in the closet who are financially and professionally secure enough to survive the negative ramifications that might follow the disclosure of their
homosexuality. They do so despite the energy and emotional stress involved in hiding an important part of their lives from family, friends,
neighbors, and coworkers. Even when lesbians and gay men "come out,"
the closet continues to play a central role in their lives. Since in many
contexts people are presumed to be heterosexual, the question of whom
to tell about one's homosexuality or bisexuality continually arises. For
example, a lesbian whose mail carrier mistakenly asks her about her
"sister," who is in actuality her lover, will have to decide whether to
"come out" to him. Similarly, lesbians and gay men may find themselves
having to worry about protecting the secrets of other lesbians and gay
men: an individual may know that her friend is a lesbian without knowing who else knows and whom she wants to know. Some have argued that
being obliged by social conventions or the "unwritten rules" of the lesbian and gay community to keep some one else's homosexuality secret is
an assault on one's dignity as a gay man or lesbian.87
The closet is a social creation, but it is enforced in various ways by
laws and judicial decisions. Courts have interpreted laws to construct
various social and legal "double binds" for sexual minorities with respect

Cause, N.Y. DMES, Mar. 5, 1993, at Al4. Even a very recent survey of college students
(albeit with a rather small sample size), found that 35% of those surveyed would have a
problem with their son or daughter being gay or lesbian. See Fradella et al., supra note 79,
at 33-34
85 See Timothy Murphy, Redirecting Sexual Orientation: Techniques and Justifications,
29 J. SEX RES. 501 (1992). See generally Edward Stein, Choosing the Sexual Orientation
of Children, 12 BIOETHICS l (1998); Stein, supra note 9, at 305-27.
86 See, e.g., EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET (1990).
87 See, e.g., RICHARD MOHR, GAY IDEAS: OUTING AND OTHER CONTROVERSIES 11-49
(1992). See generally LARRY GROSS, CONTESTED CLOSETS: THE POLITICS AND ETHICS OF
OUTING (1993) (discussing the history and ethics of "outing" public figures through journalism).
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to their identities and their expression. 88 Lesbians and gay men are (implicitly or explicitly) told to keep their sexual orientations secret, while,
on the other hand, they are (implicitly or explicitly) told to confess them.
Similarly, they are told that their identities are protected (although their
behavior may be restricted), while conversely, they are discriminated
against in certain contexts even when they keep quiet about their identities.
Consider the case of Joseph Acanfora. 89 Several weeks after he was
hired as a public school teacher, school officials learned Acanfora was
gay. Acanfora was thereafter transferred to an administrative position that
did not involve any contact with students. After his transfer, Acanfora
sued the school system demanding his return to the classroom. He also
granted several television and newspaper interviews to discuss his situation.
The trial court held that Acanfora's removal from the classroom was
reasonable, especially in light of his interviews, which showed a lack of
the sort of propriety teachers ought to show. 90 The Court of the Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit upheld Acanfora's removal but on different
grounds. They held that Acanfora's interviews concerned "matter[s] of
public interest," including the difficulties that homosexuals encounter in
families, employment, and the community at large. His speech in these
contexts was, therefore, protected under the First Amendment and did not
"justify . .. the action taken by the school system." 9 1 The court nevertheless found that Acanfora's removal was justified because he lied to
school officials by withholding the information that, in college, he had
been involved in a "homophile" organization that "had as its purpose the
development of public understanding about homosexuality." 92 Although
the school officials admitted that they would have refused to hire Acanfora on the basis of his membership in such an organization, the Fourth
Circuit found that his failure to mention his membership in this organization disqualified him from challenging his dismissal. The trial court
justified Acanfora's removal from the classroom because he was open
about his homosexuality, while the appellate court justified his removal
because he kept it secret.
To make matters more complex, consider two other court rulings
about homosexuality and public school teachers. In National Gay Task
Force v. Board of Education of Oklahoma City, 93 the Court of Appeals for
88

SEDGWICK, supra note 86.
Acanfora v. Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery County, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974).
90 Acanfora v. Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery County, 359 F. Supp. 843, 856-57 (D. Md.
1973), ajf'd, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974).
9
' Acanfora, 491 F.2d at 500-01.
92 Id. at 501.
93 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd by an equally divided court, 470 U.S. 903
(1985); see also Aumiller v. Univ. of Del., 434 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Del. 1977) (holding that
a teacher may not be fired for speaking out on homosexuality when such speech is not
89
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the Tenth Circuit held that, under Brandenburg v. Ohio, 94 a teacher cannot
be fired for advocacy of homosexual activity (for example, advocacy of
same-sex sodomy, which was at the time illegal in Oklahoma), although a
teacher can be fired for public homosexual activity. Contrast this holding
with Rowland v. Mad River Local School District, 95 decided by the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in the same year as National Gay Task
Force. In Rowland, a guidance counselor was suspended and subsequently not rehired when she told a secretary, an assistant principal, and
several teachers that she was bisexual and involved in a relationship with
another woman. The district court found that Rowland's firing violated
her freedom of speech. 96 The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that Rowland's speech did not involve "a matter of public concern." 97 According to
the Fourth Circuit, Acanfora's homosexuality is a matter of public concern; but according to the Sixth Circuit, Rowland's bisexuality is not.
Given such a tangle of rulings, what was a gay teacher supposed to
do after 1985? In this situation and others like it, lesbians, gay men, and
bisexuals find themselves in a "double bind."98 Although the situation for
lesbian and gay teachers may have improved,99 the closet has continuing
vitality in our culture.
For example, the current law regarding lesbians and gay men in the
United States Armed Forces reads, in relevant part:
A member of the armed forces shall be separated from the
armed forces . . . if one or more of the following findings is
made and approved in accordance with procedures set forth in
such regulations:
( 1) That the member has engaged in, attempted to engage in,
or solicited another to engage in a homosexual act or acts unless
there are further findings ... that the member has demonstrated
that(A) such conduct is a departure from the member's usual
and customary behavior;
intended to generate publicity).
94 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (holding that, under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the mere advocacy of illegal activity may not be criminalized).
95 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984).
96 Id. at 456-60 (appendix to appellate decision that contains the special verdicts of the
district court).
91
Id. at 449 .
98 WILLIAM N . ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER AND THE LAW
629 (1997).
99 See, e.g., Glover v. Williamsburg Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. , 20 F. Supp. 2d 1160
(S .D. Ohio 1998) (holding that the decision not to renew a gay teacher's contract was motivated by animus and thus violated equal protection); Weaver v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 29 F.
Supp. 2d 1279 (D. Utah 1998) (holding that the removal of a lesbian volleyball coach
based on her sexual orientation violated equal protection).
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(B) such conduct, under all the circumstances, is unlikely
to recur;
(C) such conduct was not accomplished by use of force,
coercion, or intimidation;

(D) under the particular circumstances of the case, the
member's continued presence in the armed forces is consistent
with the interest of the armed forces in proper discipline, good
order, and morale; and
(E) the member does not have a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts.
(2) That the member has stated that he or she is a homosexual
or bisexual, or words to that effect, unless there is a further
finding ... that the member has demonstrated that he or she is
not a person who engages in, attempts to engage in, has a propensity to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts.
(3) That the member has married or attempted to marry a person known to be of the same biological sex. 100
Within months of the codification of this policy, the Department of Defense issued various regulations for implementing this policy. 101 According to these regulations, the military may not ordinarily inquire into or
investigate a service member's sexual orientation unless there is "credible information that there is a basis for a discharge.'' 102 However, if there
is any indication of homosexual activity, or actions or speech that indicate a propensity to engage in such activity, the service member may be
discharged. Various federal appellate courts have upheld the constitutionality of this policy. 103 Given the relative weakness of First Amendment
protections in the military context, military policies restricting speech of
service members are usually upheld. 104 In particular, several courts have
10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (2000).
See, e.g., Qualification Standards for Enlistment, Appointment, and Induction,
Dep't of Def. Directive No. 1304.26 (effective Feb. 5, 1994); Enlisted Administrative
Separations, Dep't of Def. Directive No. 1332.14 (effective Feb. 5, 1994) [hereinafter Directive No. 1332.14]; Separation of Regular Commissioned Officers, Dep't of Def. Directive No. 1332.30 (effective Feb. 5, 1994).
102 Directive No. 1332.14, supra note 101 , encl. 3, attach. 4, § I. I.I (specifying
"Guidelines for Fact-Finding Inquiries into Homosexual Conduct").
103 See, e.g., Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 1997); Able v.
United States, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d Cir. 1996); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir.
1996); Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256 (8th Cir. 1996).
104
Although courts widely cite Chief Justice Warren's admonition that "our citizens in
uniform may not be stripped of basic rights simply because they have doffed their civilian
clothes," see, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983) (quoting Earl Warren,
The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 188 (1962)), often they do not
seem to heed it. For example, the Supreme Court held that the Air Force may prevent a
100
101
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held that the restrictions on speech involved in the military's policy on
homosexuality are justified because they are closely related to a strong
governmental interest. 105 The military's policy concerning homosexuality
makes the military an especially difficult environment for lesbians and
gay men; a single utterance by a service member suggesting that he or
she is gay or lesbian may result in his or her discharge. 106 Under this
policy, lesbians and gay men in the military live in a legally enforced
closet. 107
Lest one think that the legal closet is a relic of the past or an eccentricity of the military, it is worth reviewing the case of Shahar v. Bowers .108 In 1990, Robin Shahar was offered a position working for the Attorney General of the State of Georgia, Michael Bowers (of Bowers v.
Hardwick fame). On her application for the job, Shahar listed her marital
status as "engaged" and indicated that her future spouse was a woman.
Before she began working, Shahar and her partner held a ceremony in
which they exchanged vows and rings. They also openly changed their
last names to Shahar, obtained the married rate on their insurance, and
openly cohabited. Bowers claimed that, in light of their public ceremony,
which Shahar herself called a wedding, he withdrew his offer of employment to Shahar because her employment would lead to public confusion about the Attorney General's stand on same-sex marriage and other
controversial issues. A divided en bane panel of the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit held that the withdrawal of Shahar's employment
offer was justified by Bowers' concern about public perception and the
internal consequences of having Shahar work in his office. The Court

service member from wearing a yarmulke while on duty and in uniform, Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), and that the Army may prohibit political speeches and
demonstrations on base. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976). For a case in which a service member won a challenge to the military, see McVeigh v. Cohen, 983 F. Supp. 215
(D.D.C. 1998), discussed infra text accompanying notes 114-119.
105 See, e.g. , Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 928 ; Able, 88 F.3d at 1292.
106 One district court permanently enjoined the military 's policy concerning homosexuality as a violation of principles of free speech, arguing that the policy "burdens
speech based solely on its content by subjecting the member to a discharge process [because of speech that states a homosexual orientation] in which the member has only at best
a hypothetical chance to escape separation"; the Second Circuit then vacated that decision.
Able v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 968, 976 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), vacated, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d
Cir. 1996). On remand, the district court again permanently enjoined the military's policy
as unconstitutional, this time relying primarily on equal protection grounds; however, that
decision was also overruled by the Second Circuit. Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 850
(E.D.N.Y. 1997), rev 'd, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998). See also infra text accompanying
notes 166-171.
107 For useful discussions of the military 's policy, see JAN ET E. HALLEY, DON'T: A
READER'S GUIDE TO THE MILITARY 's ANTI-GAY POLICY (1999), Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of "Don 't Ask,
Don 't Tell," I 08 YALE L.J. 485 (I 998), and Tobias Barrington Wolff, Compelled
Affirmations, Free Speech, and the U.S. Military's Don't Ask, Don't Tell Policy, 63 BROOK.
L. REV. 1141 (1997) .
108 114 F.3d 1097 (I Ith Cir. 1997) (en bane).
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held that, under the Pickering balancing test, 109 Georgia's interest "as an
employer in promoting the efficiency of the Law Department's important
public service" outweighed Shahar's First Amendment interests. 110 If
Bowers' rationalization is to be believed, Shahar was refused a job not
because of her homosexuality, but for openly engaging in a same-sex
wedding ceremony. Apparently, had Shahar remained in the closet, the
failure to hire her would have been unconstitutional.

D. Sexual Minorities and Cyberspace
In light of the social and legal obstacles facing lesbians and gay men
and, in particular, the social structure of the closet, cyberspace is an ideal
environment and a "virtual lifeline" 111 for lesbians, gay men, and other
sexual minorities. The following three examples illustrate this point.

1. Emmalyn Rood
Emmalyn Rood is a teenager who lives in Portland, Oregon. When
she was approximately fourteen years old, Emmalyn began to think she
might be a lesbian. Emmalyn wanted to understand various issues relating to homosexuality and her own sexual orientation. Afraid that her
mother would discover her if she pursued this project at home, Emmalyn
turned to her local public library. Among the resources available at this
library were computers that provided free access to the Internet. Emmalyn used these computers to visit Web sites providing information
about sexuality and to take advantage of interactive modes of cyberspace
communication, such as e-mail and chat rooms. Emmalyn was able to
find a supportive community in cyberspace to help her embrace her own
sexuality and, subsequently, was able to come out as a lesbian, first to
herself and then to her family and friends . 11 2

2. Jeffrey

In the summer of 1999, when he was 15, ... Jeffrey . .. admitted to himself that he was gay. This discovery had been coming
on for some time; he had noticed that he felt no attraction to
girls and that he became aroused when showering with other
109 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (articulating a balancing test
whereby a government employee's rights as a citizen to speak on matters of public interest
are to be weighed against the government's interest in having employees perform public
services).
11 0
Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1110.
111
ACCESS DENIED, supra note 38, at 4.
11 2 Petitioner's Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 44-45, Multnomah
County Pub. Library v. United States, No. 01 - 1332 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
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boys after physical education class. But Jeffrey is a devout
Southern Baptist, attending church several times each week,
where, he says, the pastor seems to make a point of condemning
homosexuality. Jeffrey knew of no homosexuals in his high
school or in his small town in the heart of the South .... He
prayed that his errant feelings were a phase. But as the truth
gradually settled over him, . . . he became suicidal. . . . He
called a crisis line for gay teenagers, where a counselor suggested he attend a gay support group in a city an hour and a half
away. But being 15, he was too young to drive and afraid to enlist his parents' help in what would surely seem a bizarre and
suspicious errand.
It was around this time that Jeffrey first typed the words "gay"
and "teen" into a search engine on [his] computer ... and was
staggered to find himself in a teeming online gay world, replete
with resource centers, articles, advice columns, personals, chat
rooms, message boards, porn sites and-most crucially-thousands of closeted and anxious kids like himself. That discovery
changed his life. 113

3. Timothy McVeigh
Helen Hajne, the wife of a non-commissioned officer in the Navy,
was organizing a toy drive for the children of members of the crew of the
ship on which her husband was posted. She had been in contact by e-mail
with various individuals, including Senior Chief Timothy McVeigh (no
relation to the convicted Oklahoma City bomber) using her America Online (AOL) account. On September 2, 1997, she received an e-mail message through her AOL account concerning the toy drive from
"boysrch@aol.com" that was signed "Tim." The evocative e-mail address
piqued her interest, so she searched for and read her correspondent's
"member profile," an online file containing an AOL user's selfdescription. According to the information in the profile, the sender of the
message was "Tim," a person who worked in the military, lived in Hawaii, and who listed his marital status as "gay." The profile also listed the
sender's hobbies as "boy watching" and "collecting pies [digitized photographs] of other young studs." Hajne passed the e-mail message and the
profile on to her husband; eventually, this information was passed on to
the ship's commanding officer. 114

113
114

Egan, supra note 14, at 110, 113.
McVeigh v. Cohen, 983 F. Supp. 215,217 (D.D.C. 1998).
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Suspecting that the sender of this e-mail was McVeigh and inferring
that McVeigh was gay, the ship's legal advisor, a member of the Judge
Advocate Generals' Corps, the military's "in-house" legal team, initiated
an investigation. A Navy investigator contacted AOL through its technical services department and, without self-identifying as a member of the
Navy or as part of an investigation of McVeigh, inquired whether the
"boysrch" account in fact belonged to Timothy McVeigh. The customer
service representative confirmed that it did.
Twenty days after Hajne received the e-mail message from "Tim,"
the Navy began discharge proceedings against McVeigh under the "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell" policy 115 because of his "homosexual conduct, as evidenced by [his] statement that [he is] a homosexual." 116 On the ground
that McVeigh had engaged in "homosexual conduct"-presumably, this
"homosexual conduct" was that he identified himself as gay in his AOL
member profile-the Navy scheduled McVeigh for discharge. 11 7 Before
this occurred, McVeigh filed in federal court for a preliminary injunction
to bar his discharge. The court held that the Navy had violated the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy by initiating an investigation of
McVeigh without sufficient evidence of prohibited behavior and that the
Navy had probably also violated a provision of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 118 by obtaining information from an online
service provider without following the appropriate procedures. 11 9
An online news magazine for lesbians and gay men aptly described
the importance of cyberspace as follows:
For countless gay men and lesbians across all age groups, the
Internet has provided a means of escape from the emotional and
social isolation that for so many people is part of being gay.
Deeply personal issues of sexual identity could, for the first
time, be explored in almost total anonymity without threat of
rejection or violence. The medium was embraced early and
10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2) (2000).
McVeigh, 983 F. Supp. at 217.
117 /d.at215.
118
18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(l)(A)-(B), (c)(l)(A)-(D) (2000). The statute reads, in part:
115
116

A provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service shall
disclose a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of
such service to a governmental entity only when the governmental entity (i) obtains a
warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or equivalent State warrant; (ii) obtains a court order for such disclosure ... ;
(iii) has the consent of the subscriber or customer to such disclosure; or (iv) submits a
formal written request relevant to a law enforcement investigation concerning telemarketing fraud for the name, address, and place of business of a subscriber or customer of such provider, which subscriber or customer is engaged in telemarketing.
Id. § 2703( c )( 1)(B ).
119
McVeigh, 983 F. Supp. at 215.
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strongly by gay people and it is widely acknowledged that gay
men and lesbians have a presence on the Internet disproportionate to their numbers. 120
Given the military' s intolerance of homosexuality, lesbians and gay men
in the military, like McVeigh, are drawn to cyberspace as a way to express and explore their sexual orientations . 121 Further, cyberspace is especially significant for gay and lesbian teenagers who, like Jeffrey and
Emmalyn Rood (before she came out), are living with their families
while keeping their sexual orientations a secret, and for whom physically
entering the lesbian and gay community may be difficult.
For homosexual teenagers with computer access, the Internet
has, quite simply, revolutionized the experience of growing up
gay. Isolation and shame persist among gay teenagers, of
course, but now, along with the inhospitable families and towns
in which many find themselves marooned, there exists a parallel
online community-real people like them in cyberspace with
whom they can chat, exchange messages and even engage in
(online) sex .... What [is] most critical to ... gay kids ... [is]
the simple, revelatory discovery that they [are] not alone.
[G]ay teenagers surfing the Net can find Web sites packed with
information about homosexuality and about local gay support
groups and counseling services, along with coming-out testimonials from young people around the world. Gay pornography,
too, can be a valuable resource; [for some youths,] male and
female ... the availability of online porn [was] critical to their
discovery of their sexual orientation. 122
In light of the social and legal challenges faced by lesbians, gay men
and other sexual minorities-in particular the pervasive institution of the
closet-cyberspace is an important refuge for many lesbians and gay
men. 123 This crucial role that cyberspace plays for many sexual minorities
120
The Data Lounge, Internet Issues, at http://www.datalounge.com/datalounge/issues/
index.html?storyline=286 (last visited Nov. 9, 2002). See also DAWSON, supra note 14.
121
For a Web site devoted to lesbians and gay men in the military, see Servicemen's
Legal Defense Network, at http://www. sldn.org (last visited Nov. 9, 2002). Timothy
McVeigh's Web site can be found at http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/9241 (last visited
Nov. 9, 2002).
122
Egan, supra note 14, at 113.
123
A possible concern with respect to the claims in this Part stems from a common observation among opponents of lesbian and gay rights: perhaps many of the claims I make
about lesbians and gay men are similarly true of pedophiles; that is, pedophiles are also
typically closeted and might find cyberspace an important refuge. This argument takes the
form of a reductio ad absurdum: clearly the pedophile's speech in cyberspace does not
deserve especially close scrutiny, and if the relationship of the pedophile to speech in cyberspace is like that of lesbians and gay men, then the speech of lesbians and gay men in
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explains why lesbians, gay men, and the organizations that represent
them are among the plaintiffs who have challenged attempts to regulate
speech in cyberspace. In the following Part, I argue, in light of this important function of cyberspace, that attempts to regulate speech in cyberspace should be carefully examined to ensure that they do not suppress
the speech of sexual minorities.

IV.

FREE SPEECH AND SEXUAL MINORITIES

A. Free Speech Generally
The First Amendment begins, "Congress shall make no law .. .
abridging the freedom of speech . ..." 124 Despite the simplicity and apparent breadth of the protections of speech, the First Amendment is not
absolute. The Supreme Court has recognized various exceptions to and
limitations on the protection of speech, with respect to both type of expression (for example, obscene speech, 125 libel, 126 and the advocacy of
violence 127 ) and context (for example, in certain broadcast media, 128 certain public fora, 129 and in the context of military employment 130). Speech
may be restricted when it is likely to incite imminent lawless action. 131
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that non-obscene but nonetheless
"indecent" speech can be regulated in the context of broadcast media. 132
The Court has essentially established a hierarchy within protected
cyberspace also does not deserve close scrutiny. This objection does not constitute a serious challenge to the arguments advocated in this Article. The distinctive problem with a
pedophile's use of cyberspace is that he will use it to arrange sexual encounters with children-encounters that are illegal and often non-consensual and, hence, immoral. See, e.g.,
Donald S. Yamagami, Prosecuting Cyber-Pedophiles: How Can Intent Be Shown in a Virtual World in Light of the Fantasy Defense, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547 (2001). A thorough articulation of this false analogy between pedophiles' speech in cyberspace and the
speech of gay men and lesbians in cyberspace is beyond the scope of this Article.
124
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment extends this prohibition on the abridgement of the freedom of
speech to states as well. See, e.g., Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc. , 427 U.S. 50, 52 n. l
(1976); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S . 88, 95 (1940); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,
666 (1925).
125 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
126
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
127
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
128
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S . 726 ( 1978).
129 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (holding that a government employee may
be discharged for private speech that interferes with government services); Bethel Sch.
Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1981) (holding that a school may prohibit a student from
giving a sexually explicit speech at a school assembly).
130 See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (I 986); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S.
828 (1976).
131 See, e.g., Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 ; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568 (1942).
132 FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 726. The Court specifically considered the "seven dirty
words" listed in George Carlin's comedy routine: shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, and ti ts.
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speech: some speech, such as speech concerning matters of contemporary
political concern, 133 receives very strong protection, and any attempt to
regulate it will be strictly scrutinized; other speech, such as indecent
speech and commercial speech, 134 may receive limited First Amendment
protection in certain contexts.
Constitutional theorists have offered various justifications for the
freedom of speech. Among the most prominent are that free speech encourages and protects the robust public debate necessary for democracy, 135 that it advances knowledge, 136 and that it promotes and ensures
individual autonomy. 137 Various scholars have criticized each of these
theoretical justifications. Depending on which justification for free
speech one embraces, one might have a different account of which types
of speech deserve First Amendment protection. The Court has not consistently endorsed any single approach, and has in fact often cited multiple theories in the same opinion.
B. The Speech of Sexual Minorities

The speech of lesbians, gay men, and other sexual minorities has received varying treatment over the course of this century, and its status
remains unclear today. Until 1958, speech that had a "tendency to corrupt
morals" was deemed obscene. The decision of the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit in One, Inc. v. Olesen illustrates how courts typically
applied the corruption-of-morals test to speech relating to homosexuality.138 One was perhaps the first gay and lesbian magazine (although the
publishers and readers of One would not have used that phrase to describe it). 139 A copy of an issue of One was confiscated under a statute
prohibiting the use of the Post Office to transmit obscene publications. 140
Applying the corruption-of-morals test, the Ninth Circuit held that the
magazine was obscene and that the Post Office could not deliver it. In
133 See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT (1948); OWEN F1ss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE
MANY USES OF STATE POWER (1996).
134 See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc ., 425
U.S. 748 (1976) (holding that commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment but
that it receives somewhat weaker protection than most other types of speech).
135
See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); MEIKLEJOHN, supra note
133; F1ss, supra note 133.
136 See, e.g., JottN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Stefan Collini ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1989) (1859); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J. , dissenting); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring) .
137 See, e.g., Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring); Timothy Scanlon, A
Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204 (1972).
138 241 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1957), rev 'd per curiam, 355 U.S . 371 (1958).
139 See ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 98, at 411 .
140 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (2000) (prohibiting the mailing of any "obscene, lewd, lascivious,
or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, paper, letter, writing, print, or other publication of indecent character").
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deciding to censor One, the Ninth Circuit focused in particular on a story
describing a young woman who was coming to grips with her homosexuality (the court deemed this story "cheap pornography calculated to promote lesbianism" 141 ) and a poem concerning public sex in England (the
court considered this poem "dirty, vulgar, and offensive to the moral
senses" 142) . Discussions and portrayals of homosexuality before 1958 in
the United States typically received this sort of judicial treatment. 143
In 1958, the Supreme Court overturned the Ninth Circuit's decision
in Olesen in a one-sentence per curiam ruling, 144 holding that the magazine was not obscene under the criteria articulated in Roth v. United
States. 145 In Roth, the Supreme Court explicitly held that obscene material is not protected speech. The Court defined obscene material as that
which "deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest," 146 and
it defined "material that appeals to prurient interest" as material "having
a tendency to excite lustful thoughts." 147 The majority went on to explain
that "sex and obscenity are not synonymous." 148 Rather, they found that
the First Amendment crucially protects "[t]he portrayal of sex ... in art,
literature and scientific works." 149 The Court provided no explanation for
its decision in Olesen, but it presumably understood the publication to
fall within one of these categories.
The test for obscenity developed in Roth has been modified over
time. In Miller v. California, 150 the Court articulated the test for obscene
speech as:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest,
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by
state law,
and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value. 151

Olesen, 241 F.2d at 777.
Id.
143 See generally WILLIAM ESKRIDGE,
THE CLOSET 57-97 (1999).
144
Olesen, 355 U.S. at 371.
145
354 U.S. 476 (1957).
146
Id. at 487.
147
Id. at 487 n.20.
148 Id. at 487.
149 Id.
150
413 U.S. 15 (1973).
151
Id. at 24 (internal citation omitted) .
141

142
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Following this test, much speech concerning homosexuality has been
held to be deserving of First Amendment protection. Recall, for example,
National Gay Task Force, in which the Tenth Circuit held that a public
employee may not be fired for advocating or promoting homosexual conduct.152 Similarly, in Van Ooteghem v. Gray, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that a public employee could not be fired for speaking
publicly in favor of civil rights for lesbians and gay men. 153
There are, however, some limitations on the protection of gay men
and lesbians' speech that are distinct from general constraints on free
speech. For example, in Singer v. U.S. Civil Service, the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit held that it did not violate the First Amendment for
a public employee to be fired for "openly and publicly flaunting his homosexual way of life." 154 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that although speech
concerning homosexuality was protected in some cases, this protection
did not extend to "open and public flaunting or advocacy of homosexual
conduct." 155 Although Singer was vacated by the Supreme Court after
new Civil Service regulations were developed, 156 some courts continued
to cite the Ninth Circuit's holding in Singer for the principle that while
public employees may not be subject to penalties because of their homosexuality, they may be penalized for being open about their homosexuality.157 The more recent cases of Rowland 158 and Shahar 159 can be understood as fitting roughly into the Singer paradigm. Neither Rowland nor
152
Nat'I Gay Task Force v. Bd. of Educ. of Oklahoma City, 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir.
1984), affirmed by an equally divided court, 470 U.S. 903 (1985).
153 Van Ooteghem v. Gray, 654 F.2d 304 (5th Cir. Aug. 1981) (en bane) (per curiam).
154 Singer v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247, 255 (9th Cir. 1976) (citation omitted), vacated, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977) ; see also McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d
193 (1971).
155 Singer, 530 F.2d at 256.
156 Singer v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977), vacating 530
F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1971). A new personnel manual was developed on December 21, 1973,
and new regulations became effective on July 2, 1975. Office of Personnel Management
Civil Service Regulations, 5 C.F.R. § 731.202 (1976). The manual was modified in light of
the decision in Society for Individual Rights v. Hampton, 63 F.R.D. 399 (N.D. Cal. 1973)
(holding that the government must stop discharging homosexuals "solely" because the
employment of such a person might result in public contempt of the government and
thereby reduce confidence in government), aff'd in part, 528 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1975). On
procedural grounds, the Ninth Circuit did not consider these changes because the new
personnel manual was not part of the record before the district court and the new regulations were adopted after the judgment of the district court. Singer, 530 F.2d at 255. The
Supreme Court, at the suggestion of the Solicitor General, remanded the case to the Civil
Service Commission for consideration in light of the new regulations. Ultimately, the Federal Employee Appeals Authority dismissed the case against Singer. For further discussion
of these proceedings, see Aumiller v. Univ. of Del., 434 F. Supp. 1273, 1294 (D. Del.
1977); Rhonda Rivera, Sexual Preference Law, 30 DRAKE L. REV. 317 (1980-1981).
157 See, e.g., Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 808 n.20 (9th Cir. 1980); Childers v.
Dallas Police Dep't, 513 F. Supp. 134, 141-42 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (denying a city employee
promotional opportunities because he was not discreet about his homosexuality), aff'd, 669
F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1982).
158 Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984).
159 Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (I Ith Cir. 1997) (en bane).
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Shahar lost her job because of sexual orientation per se. Rowland was
fired because of her private speech (telling some of her co-workers that
she was bisexual) . 160 Shahar was not hired because of her "expressive
conduct" (having a public wedding with another woman). 161 In a similar
vein, the Supreme Court effectively validated the decision made by organizers of the St. Patrick's Day parade in Boston to prohibit lesbians
and gay men from marching in the parade carrying signs identifying
themselves as Irish lesbians and gay men. 162
Additionally, the military ' s policy concerning homosexuality 163 is
akin to the Singer paradigm in restricting the speech of lesbians and gay
men. There is a seemingly straightforward argument that this policy violates free speech: a service member faces strong sanctions for making a
statement such as, "I am gay," or "I am a lesbian." Although such speech
ostensibly does not lead automatically to the service member's discharge
from the military, 164 it does create a strong but rebuttable presumption
that the service member is likely to violate the law against homosexual
conduct. 165
District Judge Eugene Nickerson held that this aspect of the military's policy concerning homosexuality violated the First Amendment. 166
Nickerson noted that lesbian and gay service members who make statements about their sexual orientation are making statements that deserve
the strongest protection of the First Amendment; 167 their "coming out"
statements constitute "important speech" because they are "expression[s]
of personal dignity and integrity." 168 As such, the government may regulate such speech only if the regulation "promotes a compelling interest"
through use of "the least restrictive means." 169 After a discussion of the
military policy and its justifications, Nickerson concluded that "under the
First Amendment a mere statement of homosexual orientation is not
See Rowland, 730 F.2d at 446.
See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1100-0 I .
162
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557,
572 ( 1995) (holding that parade organizers had a free speech right not to be compelled to
include openly lesbian and gay Irish people in their parade). For discussion of Hurley, see
infra text accompanying notes 258-261; see also Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Accommodating Outness: Hurley, Free Speech, and Gay and Lesbian Equality , I U. PA. J. CONST. L.
85 (1998) .
163
10 U.S.C. § 654 (2000) ; see also supra notes 100-106 and accompanying text.
164 In many cases, like McVeigh's, the military violates its own policy. See McVeigh v.
Cohen, 983 F. Supp. 215 (D.D.C. 1998) ; see also STACEY L. SOBEL ET AL. , CONDUCT UNBECOMING: THE SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT ON "DON ' T ASK , DON'T TELL, DON'T PURSUE"
(2000), available at http://www.sldn.org/templates/law/record.html?section=22&record=
160

16 1

21.

10 U.S.C. § 654 (2000).
Able v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 968 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), vacated, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d
Cir. 1996).
167
I argue that this conclusion should be applied to lesbians and gay men in general,
not just to gay and lesbian service members. See infra Part VII.
168 Able, 880 F. Supp. at 973.
169 Jd.
165

166
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sufficient proof of intent to commit acts as to justify the initiation of discharge proceedings." 170 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
overturned Nickerson's decision, 171 applying a more deferential First
Amendment standard. Under this weaker test, the military's policy satisfied the compelling interest and least restrictive means tests. 172
In sum, although lesbians and gay men and their speech are protected by the First Amendment, courts have found that these protections
are subject to various limitations. In particular, the social and legal construct of the closet interacts with the free speech rights of lesbians and
gay men in inconsistent ways. Although lesbians and gay men are genderally free to speak about their sexual orientations, lesbian and gay
rights, and other issues of interest and concern to them, their speech remains subject to some state and social sanctions. Neither speaking as a
gay man or lesbian nor speaking about homosexuality is without negative
ramifications, especially in comparison to speaking about heterosexual
relationships, heterosexual lifestyles, and heterosexual sex.
V. ANONYMOUS SPEECH

A. Theoretical Perspectives on Anonymous Speech
1. Arguments in Favor of Protecting Anonymous Speech
Perhaps the most significant argument made by both courts and
scholars in favor of protecting anonymous speech is that anonymity contributes to the type of public debate that is central to a democracy. 173
Anonymity encourages people to freely express their views . If a person
must identify herself in order to express an opinion, unpopular opinions
are less likely to be expressed. The expression of a multiplicity of viewpoints, especially controversial ones, is crucial to sustaining a vibrant
democratic nation. Measures must be taken to ensure that people are
willing to express their views, particularly with respect to matters of political controversy or of significance to the general public. The desire for
a robust public debate on important matters of political concern supports
the protection of anonymous speech.
If anonymity facilitates the expression of unpopular viewpoints, it is
possible to understand the failure to protect anonymous speech as an im110

Id. at 976.

171

Able v. United States, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d Cir. 1996).

172

Id. at 1296.

173 See, e.g., Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability:
Challenges to the First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J . 1639 (1995); Amy
Constantine, What 's in a Name ? McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission: An Examination
of the Protection Afforded Free Speech, 29 CONN. L. REV. 459 (1996) ; Lee Tien, Who's
Afraid of Anonymous Speech ? McIntyre and the Internet, 75 OR. L. REV. 117 (1996); see
also infra text accompanying notes I 86-212 (discussing cases).
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plicitly content-based restriction on speech. The Supreme Court has articulated different standards for evaluating laws that involve contentbased restrictions as compared to those that involve content-neutral restrictions. The most suspect type of content-based restrictions entails
restriction of speech based on the view it expresses, or viewpoint discrimination. Consider, for example, Kingsley International Pictures
Corp. v. Regents of the University of New York. 174 A state licensing law
prohibited the showing of films that involved the positive portrayal of
"acts of sexual immorality." On this basis, the state withheld a license
from the film "Lady Chatterley 's Lover," which intimated that adultery
may be morally permissible under some circumstances. The Supreme
Court overturned the law because it prohibited speech on the basis of
viewpoint; the "very heart" of the First Amendment is that its protection
is not "confined to the expression of ideas that are conventional or shared
by a majority." 175
The prohibition on content-based discrimination, reaffirmed in
R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 176 can be understood as justifying the protection
of anonymous speech. If anonymous speech is not protected, then people
who hold unpopular opinions on matters of controversy will, in some
cases, withhold their expression of these opinions. By contrast, people
who hold popular opinions will not similarly withhold their speech. As a
result, the expression of unpopular viewpoints will be restricted in violation of the First Amendment.
Protections for anonymous speech can also be linked with the right
to privacy. In a line of cases from Griswold v. Connecticut 177 to Roe v.
Wade, 178 the Court has articulated a right to privacy-a right to freedom
from state interference in certain aspects of one's life. If the First
Amendment protects the right to speak publicly and to participate in discussions of matters of political concern, the right to privacy protects
one's right to speak without undermining her privacy. If the central goal
of the First Amendment is robust public debate, the state should remove
barriers from active participation. The requirement that a person give up
a significant portion of her privacy in order to speak will reduce the
scope of debate by decreasing the likelihood that certain people will participate in public discussions.
Anonymous speech can be similarly defended with respect to alternative justifications of the right to free speech. The expression of un-

174

360 U.S. 684 ( 1959).

175

/d. at 688-89.

505 U.S. 377 (1992); see infra text accompanying notes 252-254.
381 U.S . 479 (1965) (holding that the right to privacy includes the right of married
couples to purchase contraceptives).
178 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the right to privacy includes a woman's right to
an abortion).
176

177
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popular views is important to attaining truth in science 179 and philosophy180 as well as politics. If free speech is crucial to the quest for truth in
the "market place of ideas," 181 then anonymous speech is worthy of protection because it ensures the expression of multiple viewpoints.
2. Arguments Against Protecting Anonymous Speech
There are, however, various arguments against protecting anonymous speech. One particularly strong argument made by commentators
and judges is that anonymity undermines accountability, 182 which prevents crime and ensures responsible contributions to public debate. An
anonymous speaker faces no consequences for speaking carelessly, callously, or even criminally. With respect to accountability, there are two
potential repercussions of anonymity that are cause for concern: first, that
anonymity will lead to crime; and second, that anonymity will undermine
free speech rather than advance it. I consider these possibilities in turn.
In Plato's Republic, while discussing what makes a person just, Socrates relates the tale of a ring that enabled its wearer to become invisible
on demand. 183 Gyges used this ring, the story goes, to seduce the queen,
kill the king, and usurp his power. The power of invisibility brought out
the true nature of Gyges: in the absence of accountability, Gyges' true .
and unjust nature was expressed. Unfortunately, anonymity carries a
similar potential for abuse. A truly anonymous speaker can libel, slander,
and defame at will. Once the state grants a broad right to anonymity,
there is little it can do to prevent people from abusing the power of
anonymous speech. The resulting possibility of harmful or even criminal
speech is a strong argument against protecting anonymity.
Anonymity will also, say its critics, undermine rather than improve
public debate on important issues. A person who contributes to public
debate anonymously lacks accountability and therefore reliabi.lity. Without knowing who a speaker is, what her biases are, or where her expertise
lies, the audience cannot evaluate the speaker's contributions to public
debate. As a result, anonymity creates a greater potential for deception
179
PAUL FEYERABEND, AGAINST METHOD (Verso 1988) (1975) (arguing that the best
strategy for science is "anything goes").
ISO BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY (1965) (arguing that philosophy tries to "overthrow the tyranny of custom" and that doing so involves considering a
wide range of viewpoints, even the most unpopular).
181
E.g., Comment, The Constitutional Right to Anonymity: Free Speech, Disclosure,
and the Devil, 70 YALE L.J. 1084 (1961) .
182
See, e.g., Mark Whitt, McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n: "A Whole New Boutique of Wonderful First Amendment Litigation Opens Its Doors," 29 AKRON L. REV. 423
(1996); Note, Bans on Anonymous Political Leajletting, 109 HARV. L. REV. 111, 180-90
(1995); see also infra text accompanying notes 193-195 and 203-207 (discussing dissenting opinions).
183
Plato, Republic, (Paul Shorey trans.) in 2 COLLECTED DIALOGUES 607 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., Princeton Univ. Press 1982).
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and frivolity in public debate. Relatedly, the possibility of anonymous
contributions to public debate may lead more people to feel the need to
be anonymous. In other words, anonymity breeds more anonymity.
Critics of anonymity might also argue that it is possible to protect
unpopular minorities without granting general protections for anonymity.
The state permits and/or provides anonymity when it is necessary to do
so. Examples include the occasional practice of masking speakers' identity on television news and talk shows as well as the witness protection
program. These exceptions suggest that anonymity can be selectively
provided to people who truly need it in order to safely contribute to public discussion. 184
Finally, anonymity undermines the role that free speech plays in
contributing to individual speakers' autonomy and sense of self. A person
who can only comfortably contribute to public debate by speaking
anonymously presumably feels unsafe in relation to society at large.
There seems to be intrinsic value to speaking openly for and as oneself.
Speaking through the veil of anonymity undermines the role of speech in
identity-formation and in one's sense of involvement in a democratic
community.

3. Responses to Arguments Against Anonymity
Few would argue that the protection of anonymous speech should be
absolute. A person who commits a crime under the cloak of anonymity
may thereby surrender her claim to anonymity. The state is thus entitled
to try to identify and punish those who use anonymity to commit a crime.
In general, it is possible to strike a workable balance between the need
for anonymity and the prevention of crime.
Further, anonymity does not in fact undermine public discourse.
People involved in public debate ultimately have to evaluate claims and
arguments independently of the people who made them. In evaluating
claims, a reader can check the facts , ponder and discuss the arguments,
and turn to people she knows for help. As a New York state court cautioned in a 1978 case involving anonymous political speech:
Don' t underestimate the common man. People are intelligent
enough to evaluate the source of anonymous writing. They can
see it is anonymous .... They can evaluate its anonymity along
with its message .... [O]nce they have done so, it is for them to

' 84 For further elaboration of this argument against the need for general protections for
anonymity, see the discussion of Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459
U.S. 87 (1982), infra text accompanying note 221.
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decide what is responsible, what is valuable and what is the
truth. 185
Finally, if the power to determine who "needs" to be anonymous resides with the state (as it does with the witness protection program), people will be less likely to express views that are critical of the state. To
receive a grant of anonymity from the state, a person would have to reveal herself to the state bureaucracy. Sometimes, however, the state itself
may be the source of a person's need to remain anonymous. For anonymity to empower people with unpopular views to speak, the decision to be
anonymous should reside in those people, not in the state.

B. Supreme Court Doctrine
Three Supreme Court cases have held that the First Amendment
guarantee of free speech includes strong protection for anonymous
speech, relying, in part, on the theoretical arguments in favor of protecting anonymous speech. 186 Talley v. California concerned a Los Angeles
municipal ordinance prohibiting the distribution of anonymous handbills.187 Los Angeles justified its ordinance by claiming that it legitimately aimed at preventing fraud, libel and false advertising. Justice
Black, writing for a six-Justice majority, overturned the ordinance, arguing that the requirement that the author of a distributed handbill must be
identified on the handbill "would tend to restrict ... freedom of expression"188 and finding the ordinance to be broader than necessary to fulfill
its legitimate aims. 189 Further, the Court observed that anonymity is often
used for the "most constructive purposes," 190 not simply for the nefarious
purposes that Los Angeles sought to prevent. The Court noted that
"[p ]ersecuted groups and sects from time to time throughout history have
been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either anonymously
or not at all." 191 The Court offered the examples of religious minorities in
England and the Founding Fathers who authored The Federalist Papers;

185
People v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978, 996 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (quoted by McIntyre v.
Ohio Election Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 348 n.ll (1995)), aff'd, 354 N.Y.S.2d 663 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1974).
186
Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999); McIntyre v. Ohio
Election Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960). Most
recently, the Court reaffirmed McIntyre and Buckley in Watchtower Bible & Tract Society
of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 122 S. Ct. 2080 (2002).
187
The Los Angeles ordinance at issue provided, "No person shall distribute any handbill in any place under any circumstances, which does not have printed on the cover, or the
face thereof, the name and address" of the people who wrote (or printed) and distributed
the handbill. Talley, 362 U.S. at 60-61 (quoting L.A. MUNICIPAL CODE§ 28.01 (1960)).
188
Id. at 64.
189
Id. at 65 .
190 Id.
191
Id. at 64.
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in both cases, people wrote anonymously or pseudonymously with positive results. 192 The Talley Court relied in particular on the idea that anonymity protects unpopular minorities and the benefits of free speech to a
democracy.
Justice Clark, writing for the dissent, argued that "the Constitution
say[s] nothing about the freedom of anonymous speech." 193 The ordinance at issue in Talley, he said, had the legitimate purpose of preventing
fraud, libel, and other crimes. The ordinance, according to the dissent,
was constitutionally legitimate in that it only requires a person "who exercises his right to free speech through writing or distributing handbills
[to] identify himself just as does one who speaks from the platform." 194
The dissent argued that Talley had made no showing that he would have
suffered any injury or restraint on his freedom of speech if he had followed the ordinance by identifying himself on the handbill. 195 The dissent
would have allowed the ordinance to stand because it had a legitimate
purpose, it in no way infringed upon a constitutionally protected right,
and, as applied, it did not cause any harm to the plaintiff. The Talley dissent thus appealed to the importance of accountability and emphasized
that anonymity should be granted only when necessary.
In McIntyre v. Ohio Election Commission, the Court reaffirmed Talley.196 McIntyre concerned an Ohio law against anonymous election
leaflets. 197 Justice Stevens, writing for a six-Justice majority (Justice
Thomas concurred only in the judgment), 198 argued that the prohibition
on anonymous leaflets is a direct and impermissible regulation of the
content of speech. Anonymity is a rhetorical tool for a writer; a writer's
decision to make use of this tool by remaining anonymous is protected by
the First Amendment. 199 The identity of the speaker is a part of a text's
content, and prohibiting anonymity is therefore a constitutionally impermissible restriction on content. Further, advocates of unpopular causes
are in particularly precarious situations; as a result, their viewpoints are
especially burdened by laws restricting anonymous speech. 200 Anonymity,

192

Id. at 65.
Id. at 70 (Clark, J. dissenting).
194 Id. at 71 (Clark, J. dissenting).
195 Id. at 69 (Clark, J. dissenting).
196 McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm' n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) .
197
The Ohio statute at issue, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.09(A) (West 1994)
(amended and recodified as OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517 .20 (West Supp. 2002)), prohibits the writing, printing, posting or distribution of material designed to influence an election "unless there appears on such form or publication . .. the name and residence of [an
officer] ... of the organization ... or the person who issues" the material.
198
McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 358 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that
the Ohio statute should be overturned because the drafters of the First Amendment clearly
believed that the right to publish anonymous political writings was included under the
freedom of press).
199 Id. at 342.
200
Id. at 345 n.8 .
193
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Stevens forcefully concluded, "is a shield from the tyranny of the majority."201 Without the possibility of speaking anonymously, unpopular viewpoints may be silenced. Protecting anonymity thereby "exemplifies the
purpose behind ... the First Amendment; ... to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation-and their ideas from suppression-at the hand
of an intolerant society." 202 The McIntyre Court thus emphasized the importance of protecting anonymous speech for preserving contentneutrality in laws regulating speech.
Justice Scalia, in a dissent joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, echoed
· Clark's dissent in Talley. Scalia argued that there is no "right-to-beunknown while engaging in electoral politics" 203 and no general right to
anonymity. 204 According to Scalia, the majority's opinion creates a new
right that is unclear, vague, and leads to "silliness." 205 The Ohio law,
Scalia argued, served several important purposes: it promoted truthfulness in campaign literature, encouraged civility in campaigns, and ensured accountability. 206 Although Scalia allowed that anonymity is required by the First Amendment when needed to "avoid threats, harassment, or reprisals," 207 he argued that the general right to anonymity created by the majority in McIntyre is too broad with respect to this purpose.
Both Talley and McIntyre involved rather narrow statutes. Nevertheless, in each the majority defended anonymous speech by appealing to
general arguments in favor of the right to anonymous speech and answered the dissenting Justices in part with theoretical arguments for protecting anonymous speech. Given the present composition of the Court,
as well as the Court's commitment to stare decisis, it seems unlikely that
McIntyre will be overturned or that the protections afforded anonymous
speech will be weakened in the near future.
This prediction is supported by the recent case of Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation,2°8 in which all nine Justices
reaffirmed the importance of anonymous speech. At issue in Buckley
were various restrictions on the process for adding voter initiatives to the
Colorado ballot. Among the restrictions was a requirement that a person
circulating a petition to get an initiative on the ballot must wear a badge
stating her name, status as "volunteer" or "paid," and, if paid, the name
and telephone number of her employer. 209 The five-Justice majority compared Colorado's badge requirement to the ordinance at issue in McIntyre
and found that the
201

Id. at 357.
Id.
Id. at 371 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
204 Id. at 379 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
205 Id. at 381 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
206 Id. at 382-83 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2
m Id. at 385 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
208 525 U.S. 182 (1999).
209 COLO. REV. STAT.§ 1-40-112(2) (2002).
202
203
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restraint on speech ... [involved in the badge requirement] is
more severe [than that involved in McIntyre because p]etition
circulation is [a] less fleeting encounter [in that] the circulator
must endeavor to persuade electors to sign the petition . ... The
injury to speech is heightened for the petition circulator because
the badge requirement compels personal name identification at
the precise moment when the circulator's interest in anonymity
is greatest. 2 10
Although the remaining four Justices disagreed with some aspects of the
majority's reasoning concerning other elements of the Colorado statutes,
Justice O'Connor Uoined by Justice Breyer), Justice Thomas, and Chief
Justice Rehnquist, in separate opinions, concurred with the majority's
evaluation of the Colorado badge requirement. Although sharply divided
on other issues, the Court was unanimous in finding that the Colorado
badge requirement was unconstitutional because of its requirement that
circulators display their names. 211
While the protection for anonymous speech that emerges from Talley, McIntyre, and Buckley prevents the state from requiring an individual
to identify herself when speaking in public, the protection of anonymous
speech is not absolute. For example, the Court has suggested that it is
consistent with free speech to require a corporation engaged in political
speech to identify itself. In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, the
Court held, "Identification of the source of [corporate] advertising may
be required as a means of disclosure, so that the people will be able to
evaluate the arguments to which they are being subjected." 21 2 Bellotti
suggests that protections of anonymous speech do not extend to commercial speech. The Supreme Court has not, however, reached the question
of the extent to which the protection of anonymous speech extends to
non-political speech.
C. Conclusion

Current Supreme Court jurisprudence clearly protects anonymous
political speech under the First Amendment. To determine whether or not
a law is consistent with free speech, the Court will look, in part, to

210

Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 199 (1999).
Id. at 217 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
("Requiring petition circulators to reveal their names while circulating a petition directly
regulates the core political speech of petition circulation."); id. at 212 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 232 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing McIntyre) .
212 First Nat' ! Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S . 765, 792 n.32 (1978) (overturning a
Massachusetts state law prohibiting corporations from making contributions to influence
the vote on ballot questions that do not "materially affect" the corporation on the grounds
that doing so would "abridge[ ] expression that the First Amendment was meant to protect.") .
21 1
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whether and how such a law protects anonymous speech. In so doing, the
Court will examine the theoretical arguments for protecting anonymous
speech, especially those relating to the anonymous speech of unpopular
minorities or of those with unpopular views whose speech might expose
them to harm. In light of the social situation of lesbians and gay men and
the saliency of the closet to that situation, lesbians and gay men qualify
as the sort of unpopular minorities whose speech deserves the protections
anonymity affords. The Parts that follow develop this line of thought in
the context of cyberspace. Given the relative anonymity of speech in cyberspace and the role that such speech plays for gay men and lesbians,
laws that restrict speech in cyberspace should be carefully examined for
their effect on the speech of sexual minorities.
VI.

CLOSETSPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

In this Part, I argue that the right to conceal one's sexual orientation
in order to fully participate in public discourse is central to lesbians and
gay men's ability to fully exercise their right to free speech. Put somewhat differently, gay men and lesbians cannot enjoy free speech unless,
when they speak as gay men or lesbians, they are allowed to speak
anonymously, either by using a pseudonym or by hiding their identities in
some other fashion . As a shorthand, I use the term closetspeech for the
speech of lesbians and gay men, when they speak as lesbians and gay
men but do so anonymously. 2 13 I argue in the following Part that, although the protections properly afforded closetspeech are not absolute,
the social and legal reality of the closet, the First Amendment protections
of anonymous speech, and the right to association demonstrate that
closetspeech is at the core of the First Amendment. Attempts to restrict
closetspeech should thus be subject to heightened scrutiny.
A. Closetspeech as Anonymous Speech

Starting in 1990 and continuing for a couple of years thereafter, a
leaflet titled "Queers Read This" was distributed at lesbian and gay
marches and in lesbian and gay venues. 2 14 The flyer indicated that it was
written and published "anonymously by queers." The leaflet said, in part,
How can I tell you[?] How can I convince you, brother, sister,
that your life is in danger[?] That everyday you wake up alive,
relatively happy, and a functioning human being, you are com2 13 Kang, supra note 8, refers to a similar phenomenon in cyberspace pertaining to race
as "cyber-passing."
2 14 Anonymous, Queers Read This: I Hate Straights (1990), reprinted in WE ARE EVERYWHERE: A HISTORICAL SOURCEBOOK OF GAY AND LESBIAN POLITICS 773 (Mark Blasius
& Shane Phelan eds., 1997).
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mitting a rebellious act. You as an alive and functioning queer
are a revolutionary. There is nothing on this planet that validates, protects or encourages your existence. It is a miracle that
you are standing here reading these words. You should by all
rights be dead ....
Straight people are your enemy. They are your enemy when they
don't acknowledge your invisibility and continue to live in and
contribute to a culture that kills you .. ..
I hate Jesse Helms. I hate Jesse Helms so much I'd rejoice if he
dropped down dead. If someone killed him I'd consider it his
own fault. I hate Ronald Reagan too, because he mass-murdered
my people for eight years .... I hate him for making a mockery
of our grief. I hate the fucking Pope ... and I hate the whole
fucking Catholic Church .... 215
Despite its wide public distribution and its frequent use of "dirty
words" and provocative speech, to my knowledge, no one was prosecuted
for the publication or distribution of this anonymous flyer. In light of
Buckley, McIntyre, Talley, and the discussion in Part V above, this is the
right result. The people who published and distributed this controversial
political leaflet had the right to do so anonymously. The discussion of
anonymous speech in Part V establishes that when sexual minorities
speak anonymously as lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals, their speech is at
the core of the speech protected by the First Amendment.
Even the Justices who dissented in McIntyre would accept a more
limited form of this argument. While the dissenters in McIntyre denied
that there is a general right to speak anonymously, 216 they allowed that a
person is entitled to speak anonymously if necessary to avoid "threats,
harassment, or reprisals." 217 The McIntyre dissenters seem to have had in
mind instances like the following. The Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971 required that political candidates and political action committees
record and make available to the Federal Election Commission the name
and address of every person who contributes more than ten dollars a year
to them. 2 18 In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court held that these requirements
were constitutional because the government's interest in fair elections
outweighs the possible infringement of the First Amendment rights of the
parties involved. 219 However, the Court held out the possibility that mi-

2 15
216

Id. at 773-74, 776.
McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 371 (I 995) (Scalia, J., dissent-

ing).
Id. at 380 (citations omitted).
2 U.S.C. § 432 (Supp. III 1973) (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 432 (2000), changing, among other things, the $10 threshold to $50).
2 19
424 U.S. 1 (1976) .
217

2 18
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nority parties might be exempted from these disclosure requirements if
they could "show ... a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure of a party's contributors' names will subject them to threats, harassment or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties." 220
In Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee, the Court
granted just such an exemption . The Court unanimously held that the risk
of "threats, harassment or reprisals" was serious enough to exempt the
Socialist Workers Party from disclosing the names of its contributors.22 1
Although both dissenters in McIntyre (Justices Scalia and Rehnquist)
also dissented in Romer, they would perhaps acknowledge that in certain
contexts, for reasons similar to those at play in Socialist Workers, lesbians and gay men might be subject to "threats, harassment or reprisals"
for being open about their sexual orientation, for advocating lesbian and
gay rights, or for engaging in provocative political speech (such as that
contained in "Queers Read This"). Even the McIntyre dissenters should
agree that lesbians and gay men are protected by the First Amendment
when they speak anonymously about matters relating to lesbian and gay
sexuality. Even if they do not, there remains a majority of the Court
poised to recognize that closetspeech, as a controversial type of speech
that is likely to inspire negative reactions, is at the heart of the First
Amendment. For many lesbians and gay men, especially for lesbians and
gay men living in the closest-in particular, lesbian and gay youth like
Emmalyn Rood and Jeffrey, and lesbians and gay men who live in isolated contexts like rural areas or the military-cyberspace is an important
and perhaps vital context in which to express themselves anonymously.
B. No Flaunting, "Don 't Ask, Don't Tell," and Similar Rules

In Part III, I argued that it is a fairly well-entrenched legal fact that
lesbians and gay men receive greater protection when their sexual orientations are kept private. For example, since the 1970s, judges, legislators,
and officials of the executive branch have articulated rules that allow
people to discuss homosexuality generally and/or to be homosexual
without losing their government jobs. Under such rules, a lesbian or gay
man is protected so long as he or she does not make his or her sexual orientation public. According to such rules, the government cannot restrict
the speech of a gay man or lesbian so long as he or she keeps quiet about
his or her sexual orientation. For example, under the military's policy
concerning homosexuality, individuals who "don't tell" (and don't engage in "homosexual conduct") will supposedly not be discharged from
the military on account of their sexual orientations. 222 This policy did not
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Id. at 74.
459 U.S. 87, 101 (1982).
222 See IO U.S.C. § 654 (2000).
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develop in a vacuum. It is a well-accepted social maxim that a gay man
or lesbian who keeps quiet about his or her sexual orientation will face
fewer problems. 223 Singer lost his job for "flaunting" his homosexuality, 224
Rowland for not keeping her bisexuality to herself, 225 and Shahar for
publicizing her relationship with another woman.226 Perhaps all three
would have avoided conflict had they remained silent; their speech would
have been protected so long as they remained in the closet.
I am not defending the holdings of Singer, Rowland, and Shahar, all
of which are problematic from both an ethical and an equal protection
perspective. 227 Rather, I am pointing to a thread that runs through a series
of judicial decisions-the results of which are often hostile to sexual minorities and gay men-namely that lesbians and gay men receive greater
First Amendment protection when they stay in the closet. This thread
dovetails with a commonly held ethical intuition that the law should
leave alone those lesbians and gay men who do not publicize their sexual
orientations. This notion and the corresponding social intuition are both
relatively weak, as I shall argue below. 228 They are nevertheless
sufficiently strong to sustain a free speech right of significance to lesbians and gay men, namely the protection of closetspeech.
Simply put, one source for the protection of closetspeech is that over
the years, society and the state, through the actions of its various
branches, have created and sustained the closet. The laws, executive orders , and court rulings that created the legal institution of the closet also
created an obligation to protect people in the closet and their free speech
rights. For example, the Ninth Circuit in Singer, by conditioning the extent of Singer's First Amendment protections to whether he kept his homosexuality discreet or flaunted it,229 intimated that Singer's speech
would be protected by the First Amendment so long as Singer stayed in
the closet. To some extent, when the state takes away the free speech
rights of some homosexuals (those who flaunt their non-heterosexuality),
it implicitly supports the speech rights of others (those who keep their
sexual orientation quiet) .

223 Those who remain closeted are not immune from harm. Insofar as some people
know one's sexual orientation, one is at risk of being "outed" (that is, of having one's homosexuality or bisexuality revealed). For a discussion of outing, see GROSS, supra note 87 ;
MOHR, supra note 87 ; John P. Elwood, Outing, Privacy and the First Amendment, 102
YALE L.J. 747 (1992); see also discussion of Sipple v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr.
665 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), inf ra text accompanying notes 235-238.
224 Singer v. United States Civil Serv. Comm ' n, 530 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. I 976), vacated,
429 U.S. 1034 (1977).
225 Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. I 984).
226 Shahar v.Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (I Ith Cir. 1997) (en bane).
227
In fact, in Part VII, infra, I wilJ argue that, in light of the considerations I disc uss
below, some aspects of the holdings of these cases undermine themselves.
228
See infra Part VII, especialJy text accompanying note 262.
229 See Singe r, 530 F.2d at 249-50.
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C. The Right to Association

The Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment as providing strong protections for the right to free association, especially when
such association has political and expressive purposes. The Court articulated this right in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson. 230 As part of an
attempt to prevent the NAACP from operating there, Alabama demanded
the names and addresses of the association's Alabama members. The
NAACP refused and was fined one hundred thousand dollars (a great deal
of money in the 1950s). The Supreme Court held that Alabama's request
for the membership list was unconstitutional because the "compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy" 231 restrains "the
freedom to engage in association," "an inseparable aspect of the liberty
[involved in] ... the freedom of speech." 232 Further, the court held that
compelled disclosure of [the NAACP's] membership is likely to
affect adversely the ability of [the NAACP] and its members to
pursue their collective effort to foster [their] beliefs ... in that it
may induce members to withdraw from the [NAACP] and dissuade others from joining it because of fear of exposure of their
beliefs through their associations. 233
Similar associational rights are involved in closetspeech. A person
has a right to be a member of an association that advocates lesbian and
gay rights, to subscribe to a gay or lesbian magazine, or to otherwise engage in associational activities related to sexual minorities without the
risk of exposure. If a person's involvement in associational activities relating to her status as a sexual minority or her involvement in the lesbian
and gay community puts her at risk of exposure or harm, then she will be
more likely to restrict her involvement in the lesbian and gay community
and, perhaps, retreat further into the closet. Closetspeech is thus closely
connected to free association.
Similarly, the First Amendment prohibits the state from conditioning
a person's right to speak on making her affiliations or beliefs known. For
example, in Shelton v. Tucker, 234 the Supreme Court held that the state
could not require teachers to report all of the organizations with which
they were affiliated because such a requirement would be an extreme and
unjustified interference with the teacher's associational freedom. The
Court's holding in Shelton appears to be in tension with the holding of
Acanfora (which did not cite Shelton, despite its apparent relevance).
357 U.S. 449 (1958) .
Id. at 462.
232
Id. at 460; see also Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S . 516 (1960).
233
Patterson , 357 U.S. at 462-63 .
234 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
230
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Requiring Acanfora to reveal his membership in a gay organization
seems to violate his First Amendment right to free association. For the
state to compel a person to come out of the closet similarly violates the
First Amendment. Just as free association is central to the First Amendment, so too is the protection of closetspeech.
D. Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co.

Protection of closetspeech, while central to the First Amendment, is
not without limitations. While the state can neither force an individual to
come out, nor condition her speech rights on whether she comes out, the
First Amendment protection of closetspeech does not, generally, reach
the actions of non-state actors. Consider the case involving the outing of
Oliver Sipple.
In 1975, there was an assassination attempt on President Gerald Ford
during which Oliver Sipple grabbed the arm of the president's would-be
assailant, preventing Ford from being harmed. Subsequently, Sipple was
hailed as a hero in the national press. Various articles, including one
published by the San Francisco Chronicle, suggested that Sipple was gay,
an implication that came as a surprise to some members of Sipple's family (and, some have speculated, prevented Ford from inviting Sipple to
the White House) . Sipple sued The Chronicle , the reporter who wrote the
article in The Chronicle, and various others charging a tortious invasion
of privacy. 235 In upholding the trial court's grant of the defendants ' motion for summary judgment, a California state appeals court identified
three elements for a tort of invasion of privacy: (a) the facts disclosed
must be private; (b) the facts must be disclosed in a public fashion ; and
(c) the facts disclosed must be offensive and objectionabie to a reasonable person with ordinary sensibilities.236 The court also noted that even a
tortious invasion of privacy is exempt from liability if the facts published
are true and newsworthy. 237 The court implicitly granted that the facts
were disclosed in a public fashion and that they were offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person, but it went on to hold that Sipple's
homosexuality was already public in that he "spent a lot of time in . ..
well-known gay sections of San Francisco; that he frequented gay bars
and other homosexual gatherings in [a variety of] cities; . . . that his
friendship with . .. [a] prominent gay was well-known ... ; and that his
homosexual association and name had been reported in gay magazines
... several times before [the assassination attempt] ."238 Further, the court
held that Sipple's homosexuality was newsworthy. The court described

See Sipple v. Chronicle Publ' g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
/d. at 667-68 .
237 Id. at 668.
238 Id. at 669.
235
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Sipple as an "involuntary public figure" who, when he became a public
figure, lost certain privacy protections that he would have had as a private
citizen. For this reason, the First Amendment protections of Sipple's
closetspeech did not trump the Chronicle's free press rights.

E. Conclusion
The First Amendment protects closetspeech. Given the ways in
which the legal institution of the closet is created and maintained by the
state, it is unconstitutional to require lesbians and gay men to come out
in order to exercise their right to free speech. Accordingly, just as the
First Amendment protects anonymous speech, it protects the anonymous
speech of lesbians ~nd gay men. The protection of closetspeech is especially robust because of the unique social situation of lesbians and gay
men. In light of the role cyberspace plays for lesbians and gay mennamely, it provides a context in which to speak freely, without identifying themselves, and without having to be physically present to communicate
with others-laws that restrict the closetspeech of lesbians and gay men
in cyberspace warrant careful and critical judicial evaluation.
VII.

COMING OUT AS POLITICAL SPEECH

Although lesbians, gay men and other sexual minorities are in some
ways safer and receive greater First Amendment protection when they are
closeted, increasingly they are coming out of the closet and speaking out
about issues of public concern. When lesbians and gay men speak outside
the closet, what happens to their free speech rights? In this Part, I argue
that when lesbians and gay men speak as open lesbians and gay menwhat I call "outspeech" (partly to emphasize the contrast with closetspeech)-their speech is political and thus deserving of strong protection
under the First Amendment. I shall make this argument in two different
ways. First, I argue that the act of coming out is political speech and thus
it is at the heart of the First Amendment. Second, I build on the argument
of Part VI. Given that closetspeech is paradigmatic of the speech that
deserves the greatest protection of the First Amendment, it would be
constitutionally impermissible viewpoint- or content-based discrimination if outspeech, the speech of open lesbians and gay men, were not
similarly protected.

A. "The Love That Dare Not Speak Its Name" Speaks
Not more than a hundred years ago, homosexuality was dubbed the
"love that dare not speak its name." 239 Today, whether to celebrate or de239 LORD ALFRED DOUGLAS,

Two LOVES (1896) quoted in THE OXFORD DICTIONARY
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ride it, people frequently discuss homosexuality in public forums, on
television, in court rooms, in legislatures, and in almost every other context. The "love that dare not speak its name" is now unwilling to keep
quiet. In fact, issues relating to homosexuality are so contentious that
Justice Scalia said there is a "culture war" 240 in this country about homosexuality. Given this trend as well as the social and legal situation of lesbians and gay men discussed in Part III, coming out-openly identifying
as a lesbian, gay man, or bisexual-is a form of political speech.241 By
coming out, one is effectively saying that being lesbian or gay is nothing
to be ashamed of and, as such, coming out deserves the strongest protection of the First Amendment. More generally, outspeech-speaking as an
open lesbian or gay man-is political speech on a topic of great public
concern. Because outspeech is political speech, any state interference
with such speech deserves the most exacting scrutiny of the courts. As
the discussion that follows will demonstrate, courts have held that outspeech is political speech and thus deserving of the strongest protection
under the First Amendment.
In 1980, Aaron Fricke, a high school student in Rhode Island, informed his principal of his desire to bring a same-sex date to the school's
prom. The principal prohibited Fricke from doing so on the grounds that
the presence of a same-sex couple would disrupt the prom and create a
threat of physical harm to the couple and to others. Fricke filed suit in
federal court. The district court held that Fricke's act of attending the
prom with another man was a "political statement" and, hence, was protected as speech under the First Amendment. 242 The court held that the
principal's reasons for not allowing Fricke to bring a same-sex date to the
prom failed to satisfy the "least restrictive means" prong of the test set
forth in United States v. O'Brien.243 Further, the court held that the primary justification given by the principal for restricting Fricke's political
speech-the threat of a violent or hostile reaction to his speech-is almost never an appropriate justification for restricting speech. 244
QUOTATIONS 255 (Angela Partington ed., 4th ed. I 992).
240
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S . 620, 652 (1996) (Scalia, J, dissenting).
24 1
See, e.g. , Bobbi Bernstein, Power, Prejudice, and the Right to Speak: Litigating
"Outness" Under the Equal Protection Clause, 47 STAN. L. REV. 269 (1995); David Cole
& William Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-Holding to Sodomy: First Amendment Protection of
Homosexual (Expressive ) Conduct, 29 HARV. C.R.-C .L. L. REV. 319 (1994) ; Janet Halley,
The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection f or Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915 (1989); Kenneth Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of
Expression and the Subordination of Groups, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV . 95, 117-20 (1990).
242
Fricke v. Lynch, 49 I F. Supp. 381 , 385 (D.R.I. 1980).
243
391 U.S. 367 (I 968) (upholding a statute prohibiting the mutilation or destruction
of a selective service registration card against a challenge on free speech grounds).
244
See Fricke, 491 F. Supp. at 387 (citing Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969)
(holding that First Amendment protects a peaceful and orderly political demonstration
even if onlookers become unruly as a result of the demonstration) and Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (holding that a city ordinance prohibiting breach of the peace
infringed First Amendment rights when used to prosecute a person whose speech invited
OF
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A similar view of the political nature of outspeech was expressed in
the late 1970s when a group of four individuals and two gay rights organizations sued Pacific Telephone and Telegraph (PTT) under a California state law preventing employers from interfering with the political
activities of their employees. 245 The California Supreme Court held that
this law applied to open homosexuals:
[T]he struggle of the homosexual community for equal rights,
particularly in the field of employment, must be recognized as a
political activity. Indeed the subject of the rights of homosexuals incites heated political debate today .... The aims of the
struggle for homosexual rights, and the tactics employed, bear a
close analogy to the continuing struggle for civil rights waged
by blacks, women, and other minorities.
A principal barrier to homosexual equality is the common feeling that homosexuality is an affliction which the homosexual
worker must conceal from his employer and his fellow workers.
Consequently one important aspect of the struggle for equal
rights is to induce homosexual individuals to "come out of the
closet," acknowledge their sexual preferences, and to associate
with others in working for equal rights.246
The court therefore held that PTT's policy of discriminating against what
the court called "manifest" homosexuals 247-namely "open" homosexuals, that is, people who "make an issue" of their homosexuality-violated
California's labor code.
The courts in Fricke and PTT both accepted that coming out of the
closet and being out as a lesbian or gay man is political speech. Together,
these two cases stand for the proposition that outspeech is the sort of
speech that is at the core of the First Amendment. 248 Outspeech, like
public dispute and aroused anger)).
245 The statute states:
No employer shall make, adopt or enforce any rule, regulation or policy (a)
[f]orbidding or preventing employees from engaging or participating in politics
... [or] (b) [c]ontrolling or directing, or tending to control or direct the political
activities or affiliations of employees.
No employer shall coerce or influence or attempt to coerce or influence his employees through or by means of threat of discharge or loss of employment to
adopt or follow or refrain from adopting or following any particular course or line
of political action or political activity.
CAL. LAB. CODE§ 1101-02 (West 1989).
246
Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592, 610 (Cal. 1979).
247 Id. at 596.
248
This view is further supported by a substantial body of legal and philosophical
scholarship. See, e.g., RICHARD MOHR, GAYS/JUSTICE: A STUDY OF ETHICS, SOCIETY, AND
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other political speech, is paradigmatic of the type of speech that the First
Amendment is designed to protect. Any attempt by the state to constrain
or interfere with outspeech is highly suspect and should be carefully
scrutinized by courts.
B. Viewpoint Discrimination

The Supreme Court has distinguished between content-based and
content-neutral laws in evaluating the constitutionality of laws that regulate speech. A content-based law is one that regulates speech on the basis
of its subject matter. Such laws are subject to strict scrutiny and are typically overturned. For example, in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley,249 the Court struck down a Chicago law prohibiting all picketing outside of a school except peaceful picketing concerning a labor dispute. 250
The Court held that the law impermissibly "restrict[ed] expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." 251 Similarly, in R.A. V v. City of St. Paul, 252 the Court struck down a St. Paul city
ordinance prohibiting the placement of certain objects and symbols that
arouse "anger, alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of race, color,
creed, religion or gender." 253 The Court held that the ordinance was "facially unconstitutional in that it prohibits otherwise permitted speech
solely on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses." 254
The distinction between content-based and content-neutral laws can
be coupled with the conclusion of Part VI-that laws restricting closetspeech cut against the central purpose of the First Amendment-to provide further support for the conclusion that outspeech is paradigmatic of
the speech protected by the First Amendment. A state prohibition of outspeech but not closetspeech would be a content-based restriction on
speech. Such a restriction would, for this reason, deserve strict scrutiny.
This seemingly straightforward argument is open to three objections.
First, one might reply that while content-based restrictions on speech are
often held to be unconstitutional, status-based restrictions on speech are
sometimes permissible. For example, in Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, the Court held that it was not a content-based
restriction on speech to withhold tax benefits from any organization that

LAW (1988); supra note 241.
249
408 U.S. 92 (1972).
250 The ordinance at issue provides that a person commits di sorderly conduct when she
knowingly "pickets or demonstrates on a public way within 150 feet of any primary or
secondary school building ... provided that this subsection does not prohibit the peaceful
picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute ...." Id. at 92-93 (quoting CHI., ILL ,
MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 193-l(i) (1968)) .
251
Id. at 95 .
252
505 U.S. 377 (1992).
253 Id. at 380 (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN. , LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)) .
254
Id. at 381.
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lobbies Congress unless it is a veterans' organization.255 That the restriction applied only to non-veterans' groups was held to be a status-based
restriction rather than viewpoint-based restriction. 256 Using similar logic,
perhaps the differential treatment between the speech of open lesbians
and gay men and the speech of closeted lesbians and gay men might be
seen as status-based rather than content-based.
This line of argument is not promising. Many instances of contentbased restrictions on speech can be recast as isomorphic status-based
restrictions on speech. For example, the law in Mosley 251 could be recast
to allow only union members (a status-based regulation) to picket rather
than to allow picketing concerning labor disputes (a content-based regulation). Such a status-based law would presumably be unconstitutional
since it has the same effect on speech as the law overturned in Mosley; a
content-based restriction of speech does not become permissible simply
because it refers to a speaker's status. Even allowing that the line between a status-based and a content-based regulation is unclear, a regulation of speech that distinguishes between outspeech and closetspeech is,
at its roots, based on content, because it distinguishes speech on the basis
of whether or not the speaker is open about his or her sexual orientation.
A second criticism of the argument that a state prohibition on outspeech but not closetspeech would be an impermissible content-based
restriction appeals to the Supreme Court's decision in Hurley v. IrishAmerican Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., in which the
court held that the state could not require the organizers of Boston's St.
Patrick's Day parade to allow a group identified as lesbian and gay Irish
people to march in the parade.258 While the parade organizers said they
were willing to allow lesbians and gay men to march in the parade, they
were not willing to let them march under a banner identifying them as an
Irish American gay, lesbian, and bisexual group. 259 The Court held that
the First Amendment gives the parade organizers the right to control the
content of their parade as they see fit: they may decide to include only
those groups and individuals that contribute the particular expressive
content to the parade that they desire. In Hurley, the Court seems to have
accepted a content-based distinction, insofar as it found that it was legitimate for the parade organizers to distinguish between gay and lesbian
marchers who were not identified as gay and lesbian, on the one hand,
and gay and lesbian marchers who were so identified, on the other. If this

461 U.S. 540 (1983) .
/d. at 548; see also Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 763 (1994)
(holding that an injunction that restricted the speech of anti-abortion protestors was not a
viewpoint-based restriction).
257
Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 92-93 (1972) .
258
Hurley v. Irish-Am . Gay, Lesbian & Bi sexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S . 557,
566 (1995) .
259
Id. at 572.
255

256
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distinction is legitimate in the context of Hurley, perhaps the distinction
between outspeech and closetspeech is legitimate in other contexts as
well.
Hurley can, however, be distinguished on several grounds. First, the
Court did not address the question of whether the parade organizers were
state actors (it was accepted that they were not). 260 Hurley can therefore
be distinguished from cases like Singer, Shahar, and Acanfora that
clearly involve state action. It does not follow from the claim that private
actors like Hurley and the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council, the
organization he represented, may make a distinction between outspeech
and closetspeech that a state actor can make such a distinction without
thereby engaging in impermissible viewpoint discrimination.
Further, it is not clear to what extent Hurley survives Romer. 261 Consider whether the Court would have ruled differently if parade organizers
had refused to let a group of African American marchers join the parade.
Would the fact that racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny have
affected the outcome of such a case? If so, perhaps the Court's acknowledgement in Romer that sometimes classifications based on sexual orientations are impermissible would undermine the holding of Hurley.
A final criticism of the theory that the First Amendment protects
outspeech is that this argument both relies on and undermines the logic
of Singer and similar cases and is thereby an illegitimate form of argument. Recall, however, that my strategy here is to build on the conclusion
of Part VI that the First Amendment protects closetspeech. In cases like
Singer, courts have essentially held that closetspeech is protected but
outspeech is not. My argument here is that to protect closetspeech but not
outspeech is an impermissible form of content regulation. I am taking
one part of the holding of cases like Singer (that closetspeech is protected) and showing that, in light of other well-established principles of
First Amendment doctrine (e.g., the rule against content-based regulation
of speech), another part of the holding of such cases (that outspeech can
be regulated) is undermined. To borrow a metaphor from Ludwig Wittgenstein, I am "throw[ing] away the ladder after [I have] climbed up on
i t."262

200

Id. at 566.
See, e.g., Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Accommodating Outness: Hurley, Free
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C. Conclusion

The preceding Part concluded that the First Amendment protects
closetspeech and, thus, in light of the role cyberspace plays for lesbians
and gay men, that the First Amendment strongly protects closetspeech in
cyberspace. A parallel conclusion follows. The First Amendment protects
outspeech by virtue of its political character. Laws that constrain outspeech are subject to strict scrutiny under the First Amendment. In light
of the role that cyberspace plays for lesbians and gay men, attempts to
restrict outspeech in cyberspace should also be strictly scrutinized.
VIII. CONCLUSION

In Part V, I argued that anonymous speech, especially anonymous
speech on matters of public controversy, is paradigmatic of the speech at
the heart of the First Amendment. The same arguments apply in cyberspace. If a present-day McIntyre decided to post on a Web site her material arguing against a referendum on a school tax or to send electronic
mail to her neighbors encouraging them to vote on a referendum, her
"cyber-pamphleteering" would deserve the same sort of First Amendment
protection as the traditional pamphleteering at issue in McIntyre. The
protections afforded anonymous speech extend to cyberspace. 263 Further,
the especially strong protection afforded the anonymous speech of unpopular minorities should be extended to the speech of lesbians and gay
men in cyberspace.
As an illustration, consider the rest of Timothy McVeigh's story.
After he discovered that AOL had illegally released his name to the
Navy, McVeigh sent e-mail messages to every AOL user with the word
"gay" in his or her member profile. In his e-mail message, McVeigh told
the story of how AOL mistreated him. As news of what happened to
McVeigh spread, many AOL users and others wrote to AOL, the White
House, the Pentagon, and Congress. The dramatic response to McVeigh's
"mass" e-mail encouraged him to sue the Navy and ensured that his case
would receive widespread media attention. It also forced AOL to clarify
its policy with respect to the privacy of its customers. 264
McVeigh's cyber-activism is a vivid example of the role cyberspace
can play in the organization of political and social change in the lesbian
and gay community. McVeigh's cyber-activism would not have been as
effective as it was (if it would have occurred at all) if lesbians and gay
men did not have the opportunity to communicate anonymously that cyberspace affords them. Specifically, without the capability to anonymously identify as "gay" or "lesbian" in their AOL profiles, far fewer
263
264
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people would list their sexual orientations in such a manner. If they did
not self-identify in this way, the type of cyber-activism in which
McVeigh engaged would have been much less effective, or even impossible.
That the speech in cyberspace of lesbians, gay men, and other sexual
minorities deserves strong protection does not entail that the First
Amendment protects all anonymous speech in cyberspace, any more than
it protects all anonymous speech outside of cyberspace. In fact, given the
growth of computer viruses 265 and cyberstalking, 266 one might argue that
the dangers of anonymous speech in cyberspace are greater than the dangers of anonymous speech in other contexts. Accountability is needed to
prevent speakers in cyberspace from sending destructive viruses to other
users , and anonymity does undermine such accountability. However, this
reality fails to undermine the argument for anonymity in cyberspace.
Computer crimes can be deterred and punished without prohibiting anonymity in cyberspace. Anonymity in cyberspace deserves at least as
much protection as anonymity in the physical (that is, non-cyberspace)
world.
Further, because of the special role that cyberspace plays for lesbians and gay men, attempts to regulate cyberspace by preventing anonymity will have a differential impact on lesbians and gay men. The arguments of Parts VI and VII entail that, in the current social situation, the
speech of lesbians and gay men-whether outspeech or closetspeech-is
at the core of the protections afforded by the First Amendment. Because
of the closet and other features of their social situation, lesbians and gay
men have special needs for the sort of anonymity that cyberspace provides. Like contributors to a small and unpopular political party, 267 in
various contexts lesbians and gay men face "threats, harassment, or reprisals"268 when they come out. As such, even judges who are skeptical of
the right to anonymous speech, like the dissenters in McIntyre , should
support anonymity for lesbians and gay men in hostile climates; protecting "persecuted groups . . . [who] criticize oppressive practices and
laws" 269 is at the very core of the First Amendment.

265 See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katya! , Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA . L. REV.
1003, 1023-27 (2001) (defining computer viruses and other types of unauthorized disruptions to computers); Michael Edmund O 'Neill , Old Crimes in New Bottles: Sanctioning
Cybercrime, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV . 237, 252-53 (2000).
266 See, e.g., U .S . DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CYBERSTALKING: A NEW CHALLENGE FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND INDUSTRY (Aug. 1999), available at http://www.usdoj .gov/criminal/
cybercrime/cyberstalking.htm; Katya!, supra note 265, at 1034-37 (defining cyberstalk-

ing).
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Given the current social situation for lesbians and gay men, cyberspace provides a unique context for lesbians, gay men and other sexual
minorities to build community, engage in activism, exchange ideas, make
friends, and build families. Many lesbians and gay men, especially lesbian and gay youth like Jeffrey and Emmalyn Rood and lesbians and gay
men who live in geographically isolated communities or in communities
where they feel uncomfortable being open about their sexual orientation
(for example, the military), make extensive use of cyberspace. The ability
to use cyberspace anonymously is thus especially significant for lesbians
and gay men. My argument that attempts to restrict closetspeech and outspeech should be carefully scrutinized is particularly applicable in the
context of cyberspace.
The First Amendment, like the Constitution of which it is a part, is a
living text that must be adapted to situations its drafters could not have
imagined. Although the Framers could not have anticipated either the
development of cyberspace or the particular social circumstances faced
by sexual minorities, their text and the theories that informed it apply to
both contexts. The speech of lesbians and gay men-and, in particular,
their anonymous and political speech in cyberspace--deserves the strongest
protection the First Amendment can provide. When legislatures craft
statutes designed to regulate cyberspace, they need to consider the unique
role that cyberspace plays in the lives of many lesbians and gay men.
When courts evaluate the constitutionality of attempts to regulate cyberspace, they need, as most courts thus far have done, to protect the freedom of speech of sexual minorities. In particular, when courts face lesbian and gay litigants challenging attempts to regulate speech in cyberspace-as they so often have and will no doubt continue to do-they
need to take special cognizance of the virtual lifeline that cyberspace
provides lesbians and gay men and carefully scrutinize laws that trench
on their First Amendment rights

